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   ABSTRACT	  	  
	  
It	  is	  by	  now	  almost	  self-­‐evident	  that	  binary	  models	  of	  the	  highly	  nuanced	  concept	  of	  gender	  are	  
at	  best	  incomplete,	  and	  limit	  understanding	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  gender	  expression.	  In	  this	  work,	  
I	  summarise	  and	  critique	  standard	  models	  of	  gender.	  I	  discuss	  three	  broad	  approaches	  to	  
gender:	  biological,	  social	  and	  biosocial.	  A	  central	  problem	  inherent	  in	  these	  approaches	  is	  that	  
they	  almost	  always	  revert	  to	  a	  form	  of	  binary	  discourse	  —	  even	  as	  they	  critique	  such	  an	  
approach	  —	  because	  the	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  gender	  is	  rooted	  in	  discrete	  
classifications.	  Drawing	  on	  theoretical	  discourse	  from	  prominent	  theorists,	  I	  explore	  an	  
alternative	  approach	  to	  gender	  classifications	  and	  experiences.	  	  
	  
I	  suggest	  that	  new	  approaches	  and	  alternate	  models	  are	  needed	  to	  express	  ideas	  and	  data	  of	  
gender	  more	  inclusively	  and	  with	  greater	  accuracy.	  This	  work	  includes	  my	  research	  and	  
discussion	  of	  a	  gender	  spectrum	  as	  represented	  by	  a	  colour-­‐wheel.	  I	  introduce	  the	  Colour-­‐
Wheel	  of	  Gender	  Diversity	  and	  its	  practical	  applications.	  	  Exploration	  of	  diversity	  and	  its	  
implications	  in	  both	  the	  personal	  realm	  and	  the	  social	  are	  essential	  in	  the	  quest	  to	  move	  
towards	  ideals	  of	  fairness	  and	  equality.	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  problem-­‐solve	  issues	  of	  
non-­‐representation	  that	  cause	  oppression	  in	  our	  society	  and	  to	  enable	  legitimate	  
understandings	  of	  a	  continuum	  of	  gendered	  realities.	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I	  Dreamed	  of	  Classifying…	  
	  
I	  dreamed	  of	  classifying	  
Good	  and	  Evil,	  as	  the	  wise	  men	  
classify	  butterflies:	  
I	  dreamed	  of	  pinning	  down	  Good	  and	  Evil	  
in	  the	  dark	  velvet	  
of	  a	  glass	  box…	  
Under	  the	  white	  butterfly,	  a	  sign	  would	  read:	  “GOOD.”	  
Under	  the	  black	  
butterfly,	  a	  sign	  would	  read:	  “EVIL.”	  
But	  the	  white	  butterfly	  
didn’t	  represent	  good,	  nor	  did	  the	  black	  butterfly	  
represent	  evil…	  And	  between	  my	  two	  butterflies,	  
green,	  golden,	  infinite,	  were	  flying	  
all	  the	  butterflies	  on	  earth!...	  
	  
By	  Dulce	  Maria	  Loynaz	  (1902–1997)(translated	  by	  Ilan	  Stavans)	  
From	  The	  FSB	  Book	  of	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Latin	  American	  Poetry	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
Theories	  of	  gender	  are	  coloured	  by	  numerous	  complex	  ideas	  and	  variables	  —	  cultural,	  
institutional	  and	  social	  factors	  —	  all	  of	  which	  accumulate	  into	  reinforced	  meanings	  of	  
difference.	  Gender	  incorporates	  a	  combination	  of	  meanings,	  including	  actions	  and	  behaviours,	  
both	  as	  others	  perceive	  them	  and	  as	  how	  we	  identify	  with	  them.	  Meaning	  encompasses	  all	  of	  
the	  things	  we	  understand	  as	  social	  roles;	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  masculine,	  feminine	  and	  
androgynous;	  our	  biology;	  conflict	  that	  arises	  between	  our	  own	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  societal	  
expectations;	  categorisation	  and	  identification;	  autonomy;	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  (Hackman,	  
2010;	  Franklin,	  2012).	  Meaning	  is	  a	  product	  of	  signification,	  a	  process	  maintained	  by	  universal	  
structures	  (Foucault,	  1977),	  and	  it	  reveals	  power	  and	  authority	  reinforced	  in	  culture	  (Butler,	  
1990,	  2004;	  Barad,	  2003).	  	  
	  
Gender	  discourse	  is	  the	  meaning-­‐making	  that	  constitutes	  realities	  of	  gender	  that	  shape	  
knowledge	  and	  identity	  within	  a	  particular	  social	  context	  (Hall,	  2007;	  Barad,	  2003).	  
Knowledge	  of	  gender	  is	  reinforced	  through	  images	  in	  the	  social	  world	  that	  serve	  as	  evidence	  of	  
those	  meanings	  (Hall,	  1997).	  Gender	  includes	  a	  complex	  combination	  of	  characteristics,	  
beliefs,	  and	  behaviours	  that	  society	  assumes	  about	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  (Franklin,	  
2012).	  Gender	  analysis	  fundamentally	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  masculine	  and	  
feminine	  in	  multiple	  aspects	  of	  culture	  and	  social	  participation	  (Hackman,	  2010).	  Although	  the	  
variables	  that	  form	  individual	  realities	  are	  numerous,	  social,	  environmental	  and	  biological	  
variables	  can	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  understood.	  While	  some	  aspects	  of	  identity	  
are	  explainable,	  others	  are	  not	  so	  easily	  defined.	  
	  
	  This	  work	  examines	  the	  conceptual	  frameworks	  used	  to	  explain	  gender,	  gender	  identity,	  and	  
formation.	  It	  argues	  that	  gender	  is	  not	  lived	  as	  a	  singularity,	  that	  gender	  is	  in	  fact	  fluid,	  
adjusting	  and	  forming	  as	  a	  result	  of	  events,	  actions	  and	  interactions	  with	  our	  environment.	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This	  research	  explores	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  fluid	  gender	  that	  encompasses	  ontological	  
connections	  from	  three	  broad	  concepts	  of	  gender:	  biological,	  socially	  constructed	  and	  
biosocial.	  It	  looks	  at	  the	  epistemological	  concerns	  of	  theorists	  who	  produce	  knowledge	  within	  
these	  areas,	  examining	  the	  justification	  and	  limitations	  of	  their	  presentations.	  	  
	  
Because	  socialisation’s	  role	  in	  mediating	  gender	  formation	  is	  crucial	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender,	  
a	  meaningful	  proportion	  of	  this	  research	  will	  engage	  with	  social	  and	  cultural	  expectations	  
(Giddens,	  2009;	  Franklin,	  2012).	  It	  will	  show	  that	  if	  we	  look	  closely	  at	  social	  and	  economic	  
lives,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  clear	  relationship	  with	  gender	  in	  almost	  all	  experiences	  (Hackman,	  2010).	  It	  
will	  also	  reveal	  that	  how	  we	  socially	  understand	  gender	  infuses	  meaning	  (Barad,	  2003).	  Thus,	  
it	  is	  impossible	  to	  consider	  gender	  outside	  the	  realms	  of	  meanings	  associated	  with	  gender.	  
Masculine	  gender	  is	  represented,	  for	  example,	  by	  characteristics	  of	  strength,	  aggression	  and	  
dominance,	  whereas	  feminine	  gender	  is	  represented	  by	  ‘natural’	  characteristics	  of	  nurturing,	  
sensitivity	  and	  compassion	  (Hackman,	  2010;	  Franklin,	  2011).	  	  
	  
However,	  this	  work	  also	  recognises	  that	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  needs	  some	  level	  of	  open	  
dialogue	  with	  biological	  factors	  if	  it	  is	  to	  achieve	  inclusive	  theoretical	  representation.	  Biology	  
is	  often	  accused	  of	  documenting	  ‘differences’	  and	  ‘otherness’	  (de	  Beauvoir,	  1949),	  reinforcing	  
‘natural’	  gender	  and	  sex	  divisions	  and	  roles	  based	  on	  inherent	  arguments	  (Hackman,	  2010).	  
However,	  within	  this	  work,	  I	  will	  reason	  that	  biology	  is	  important	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender.	  
This	  assertion	  rests	  on	  the	  view	  that	  biology	  does	  not	  describe	  inherent	  or	  deterministic	  
values	  based	  on	  sex	  categorisation	  or	  evolutionary	  reproductive	  mechanisms.	  Instead,	  biology	  
provides	  evidence	  that	  lived	  gender	  is	  naturally	  diverse	  and	  is	  not	  a	  dichotomous	  relationship	  
of	  masculine	  or	  feminine	  characteristics.	  
	  
I	  undertook	  this	  work	  to	  discover	  what	  contemporary	  conceptual	  frameworks	  of	  gender	  
obscure	  and	  to	  show	  that	  current	  theories	  of	  gender	  rely	  on	  binary-­‐based	  definitions,	  despite	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evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  My	  research	  found	  that	  although	  there	  are	  models	  that	  try	  to	  adapt	  
the	  foundations	  of	  current	  gender	  understandings,	  they	  rely	  on	  and	  privilege	  binary	  
interpretations	  of	  gender	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992,	  1993,	  2000,	  2003;	  Lorber,	  1993,	  1994).	  I	  will	  
argue	  that	  many	  of	  us	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  binary	  of	  gender.	  This	  research	  argues	  that	  
representations	  of	  gender	  as	  a	  binary	  of	  male/female	  are	  limiting,	  constraining	  and	  
discriminating	  because	  they	  place	  experience	  into	  a	  dichotomy.	  As	  pure	  categories,	  these	  
terms	  are	  problematic	  for	  both	  males	  and	  females.	  I	  further	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  totally	  
reconceptualise	  gender	  from	  the	  ground	  up	  —	  my	  model	  provides	  a	  valuable	  perspective	  that	  
helps	  us	  discuss	  non-­‐conforming	  human	  diversity.	  	  
	  
Ultimately,	  I	  propose	  that	  we	  need	  new	  models	  for	  exploring	  diversity	  so	  we	  can	  move	  away	  
from	  divisive,	  limiting	  and	  unhelpful	  comparisons	  (Butler,	  1990;	  Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1993,	  2000;	  
Lorber,	  1993,	  1994;	  Overall,	  2009).	  Therefore,	  I	  have	  considered	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  many	  
theoretical	  understandings	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  presenting	  the	  Colour-­‐Wheel	  of	  Gender	  Diversity	  as	  
a	  tool	  for	  representing	  all	  potential	  versions	  of	  gender.	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CHAPTER	  ONE:	  THE	  ARCHITECTURE	  OF	  GENDER	  	  
	  
Sex	  
Sex	  refers	  to	  the	  anatomical	  and	  biological	  variances	  between	  females	  and	  males.	  Females	  
have	  two	  X	  chromosomes,	  while	  males	  have	  one	  X	  and	  one	  Y	  chromosome.	  From	  this	  basic	  
genetic	  variance,	  other	  biological	  modifications	  develop.	  The	  genitalia	  are	  called	  ‘primary	  sex	  
characteristics’,	  while	  the	  other	  transformations	  that	  develop	  during	  puberty	  are	  called	  
‘secondary	  sex	  characteristics’	  and	  are	  described	  as	  stemming	  from	  hormonal	  differences	  
(Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  From	  a	  social	  perspective,	  biologically	  perceived	  sex-­‐linked	  
differences	  influence	  perceptions	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  female	  or	  male	  gender	  (Fausto-­‐
Sterling,	  1992,	  1993).	  
	  
In	  biology,	  the	  term	  ‘sex’	  (APA,	  2011)	  is	  used	  as	  an	  indoctrinated	  concept,	  which	  is	  considered	  
the	  biological	  point	  from	  which	  bodies	  are	  gendered.	  Discussion	  addressing	  an	  individual’s	  
gender	  usually	  occurs	  within	  recognition	  that	  gender	  is	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  an	  
individual’s	  sex.	  Biological	  explanations	  are	  comprehensively	  connected	  to	  an	  individual’s	  
birth	  ‘sex’,	  and	  primarily	  observe	  individuals	  looking	  for	  systematic	  determinants	  of	  gender	  
characteristics.	  In	  ‘traditional	  models	  of	  gender’,	  determinants	  of	  gender	  are	  recognised	  as	  the	  
socially	  conceptualised	  explanations	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  inherently	  
belong	  to	  all	  male	  and	  female	  individuals	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  	  
	  
Gender	  
There	  are	  various	  ways	  of	  considering	  ‘gender’,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  ‘gender’.	  ‘Gender’	  is	  
predominantly	  understood	  as	  either	  a	  social	  construct	  or	  as	  the	  intimate	  connection	  of	  the	  
mind	  to	  physical	  body.	  Gender	  is	  often	  described	  as	  so	  central	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  ‘self’	  
and	  to	  our	  perspectives	  and	  positions	  in	  the	  world	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  examine	  it	  from	  new	  
viewpoints	  (Hackman,	  2010;	  Bornstein,	  1998).	  Social	  theorists	  often	  discuss	  gender	  as	  a	  
construction:	  gender/sex	  alignment	  is	  institutionalised	  into	  social	  agreements,	  and	  gender	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alignment,	  as	  the	  status	  quo,	  legitimises	  citizenship	  and	  social	  status	  (Butler,	  1990,	  2004;	  West	  
&	  Zimmerman,	  1987).	  Individuals	  who	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  this	  categorisation	  are	  situated	  in	  the	  
group	  of	  	  ‘other’	  (de	  Beauvior,	  1949).	  The	  sciences	  typically	  explain	  gender	  with	  reference	  to	  
the	  attitudes,	  feelings	  and	  behaviours	  that	  a	  given	  culture	  associates	  with	  an	  individual’s	  
biological	  sex	  (Giddens,	  2009).	  
	  
Our	  bodies	  are	  generally	  gendered	  at	  birth	  and,	  as	  we	  become	  socialised	  into	  our	  culture,	  our	  
gender	  evolves	  into	  a	  concept	  or	  an	  identity.	  If	  gender	  formation	  occurs	  as	  a	  process	  of	  identity	  
being	  completed,	  this	  suggests	  that	  our	  entire	  social	  realities	  support	  and	  nurture	  our	  
preferred	  gendered	  existence.	  What	  makes	  this	  concept	  of	  gender	  difficult	  is	  that	  gender	  
identity	  refers	  to	  more	  than	  an	  individual’s	  perception	  of	  their	  identity	  (Feinberg,	  1996;	  
Bornstein,	  1998).	  It	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  cultural	  meanings	  represented	  by	  the	  identification	  
(Hackman,	  2010;	  Cooley,	  1902;	  Chodorow,	  1978).	  Traditionally,	  gender	  identity	  primarily	  
described	  a	  person’s	  sense	  of	  themselves	  as	  male,	  female,	  intersex,	  or	  transgender	  (APA,	  
2011).	  These	  concepts	  also	  categorise	  the	  social	  world,	  each	  having	  a	  set	  of	  understandings	  
and	  interpretations	  that	  permeate	  the	  experience	  of	  belonging	  to	  that	  category	  (Fausto-­‐
Sterling	  1993,	  2000,	  2000b,	  2003;	  Kessler,	  2002).	  	  
	  
Beyond	  that	  ‘traditional	  model	  of	  gender’,	  theories	  of	  gender	  identification	  now	  interpret	  
gender	  as	  belonging	  not	  in	  a	  traditional	  context	  but	  on	  an	  expansive	  continuum	  that	  includes	  
its	  expression,	  associated	  identities,	  and/or	  other	  perceived	  gender	  norms,	  in	  one	  or	  more	  
aspects	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life	  (Chiñas,	  1995).	  For	  example,	  the	  term	  transgender	  is	  an	  umbrella	  
term	  that	  ‘generally	  refers	  to	  any	  and	  all	  kinds	  of	  variation	  from	  gender	  norms	  and	  
expectations’	  (Stryker,	  in	  Stryker	  &	  Whittle,	  2006,	  p.	  19).	  Describing	  gender	  as	  expansive	  is	  
more	  appropriate	  than	  the	  traditional	  model	  because	  it	  recognises	  that	  some	  people	  do	  not	  
identify	  as	  either	  male	  or	  female,	  others	  identify	  as	  a	  blend	  of	  both,	  while	  still	  others	  identify	  
with	  a	  gender	  but	  express	  their	  gender	  in	  ways	  that	  differ	  from	  stereotypical	  presentations	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and	  may	  fall	  outside	  an	  individual’s	  normative	  cultural	  gender	  assumptions	  (Stryker,	  2004;	  
Chiñas,	  1995).	  	  
	  
Sex	  and	  Gender	  as	  Interchangeable	  Concepts	  
Opposition	  to	  the	  use	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  as	  interchangeable	  terms/concepts	  has	  aroused	  
debate,	  both	  within	  the	  field	  of	  biology	  and	  in	  alternative	  theories	  of	  gender.	  Although	  the	  
terms	  ‘sex’	  and	  ‘gender’	  are	  sometimes	  used	  interchangeably	  and	  as	  complementary,	  they	  do	  
refer	  to	  different	  aspects	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  female	  or	  male	  culturally.	  The	  World	  Health	  
Organization’s	  (WHO)	  website	  states:	  ‘“Gender”	  describes	  those	  characteristics	  of	  women	  and	  
men	  that	  are	  largely	  socially	  created,	  while	  “sex”	  encompasses	  those	  that	  are	  biologically	  
determined.	  However,	  these	  terms	  are	  often	  mistakenly	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  scientific	  
literature,	  health	  policy,	  and	  legislation.’	  (p.	  1).	  Virginia	  Prince,	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  medical	  
intervention	  with	  transgender	  people,	  also	  refutes	  biological	  explanations	  that	  confuse	  the	  
terms;	  she	  explains	  that	  they	  are	  clearly	  distinguishable,	  saying	  ‘genital	  anatomy	  refers	  to	  sex;	  
gender	  role	  is	  about	  a	  lifestyle’	  (Prince,	  2005,	  p.	  20).	  	  
	  
	  It	  is	  most	  likely	  that	  some	  contradictions	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  are	  partially	  
entwined	  with	  the	  redefinition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘gender’	  by	  Money	  (1952),	  and	  then	  by	  Stoller	  
(1968).	  The	  works	  of	  these	  two	  theorists	  changed	  our	  understandings	  and	  interpretations	  of	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  ‘have’	  gender.	  Money	  (1952)	  and	  Stoller’s	  (1968)	  treatment	  of	  the	  term	  
‘gender’	  meant	  it	  came	  to	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  an	  individual’s	  socialisation	  and	  the	  cultural	  
assimilation	  of	  one’s	  sex	  identification.	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  two	  theorists,	  the	  
discourse	  and	  definitions	  of	  the	  term	  ‘gender’	  became	  inclusive	  and	  descriptive	  of	  the	  cultural	  
roles	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  as	  represented	  through	  an	  individual’s	  characteristics	  and	  
as	  a	  alternative	  to	  the	  term	  ‘sex’,	  which	  referred	  to	  biological	  understandings.	  Although	  new	  
ways	  of	  recognising	  gender	  emerge	  from	  biosocial	  theoretical	  models,	  gender	  interpretation	  
still	  remains	  a	  binary	  that	  does	  not	  fully	  capture	  individuals’	  lived	  experiences.	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CHAPTER	  TWO:	  GENDER	  AS	  BIOLOGICAL	  
	  
Introduction	  
This	  section	  discusses	  theories	  of	  gender	  that	  primarily	  align	  gender	  with	  biological	  sex.	  It	  
covers	  biological	  definitions	  of	  gender,	  presenting	  some	  interesting	  and	  illuminating	  aspects	  of	  
the	  biological	  approach.	  It	  also	  critiques	  some	  of	  the	  essentialist	  aspects	  of	  biological	  theory	  
that	  do	  not	  fully	  resolve	  themselves.	  Foremost,	  this	  section	  will	  examine	  explanations	  of	  how	  
biology	  is	  thought	  to	  modify	  behaviour	  by	  addressing	  the	  key	  components	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  
the	  biological	  body	  considered	  as	  significant	  to	  understanding	  gender	  (Kolb	  &Whishaw,	  1999).	  
Finally,	  this	  work	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  biological	  paradigm,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  ‘produces’	  and	  
‘explains’	  types	  of	  bodies	  that	  legitimise	  gender-­‐based	  assumptions	  (Fausto-­‐	  Sterling,	  1993,	  
2000,	  2000b,	  2003;	  Richardson,	  2014;	  Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  
	  
The	  relationship	  between	  ‘biology’	  and	  ‘gender’	  is	  problematic	  because	  it	  lends	  itself	  to	  
essentialist	  interpretations,	  identifying	  sexed	  bodies	  as	  having	  separate	  categorical	  functions	  
and	  presentations	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992).	  A	  discussion	  of	  biology	  that	  addresses	  how	  the	  
body	  is	  connected	  to	  gender	  is	  important	  because	  it	  unlocks	  our	  similarities	  to	  one	  another	  
while	  also	  showing	  variance.	  It	  can	  also	  transcend	  sex	  definitions	  by	  illuminating	  significant	  
aspects	  of	  gender	  diversity.	  	  
	  
Gender	  as	  Conceptualised	  Through	  a	  Biological	  Lens:	  Explanations	  of	  Sex1	  
Differences	  
Biology	  commonly	  advances	  three	  explanations	  for	  sex/gender	  differences:	  (1)	  maturation	  
from	  foetus	  to	  adulthood,	  (2)	  hormonal	  effect	  on	  cerebral	  function,	  and	  (3)	  genetic	  sex-­‐linkage	  
(Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999,	  p.	  227).	  Other	  factors	  contribute	  to	  gender	  characteristics	  at	  a	  
secondary	  level;	  these	  include	  environment	  and	  cognitive	  understandings.	  The	  fundamental	  
features	  of	  biological	  theories	  are:	  natural	  selection/evolution,	  heredity	  and	  genetics,	  and	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instincts/sociobiology.	  A	  basic	  assumption	  is	  that	  biological	  methods	  are	  studied	  scientifically,	  
often	  in	  a	  laboratory,	  but	  always	  considering	  biological	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  (Kolb	  &	  
Whishaw,	  1999).	  Biological	  theories	  of	  gender	  assume	  that	  behaviour	  can	  be	  largely	  explained	  
in	  terms	  of	  biology,	  for	  example	  through	  information	  stored	  in	  genes	  or	  through	  the	  study	  of	  
hormones	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Specifically,	  methods	  look	  for	  structural	  changes	  or	  
functions	  within	  those	  biological	  areas	  that	  can	  affect	  or	  indicate	  particular	  gendered	  
behaviour	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  	  
	  
Fundamentally,	  biological	  assumptions	  of	  the	  ‘study	  of	  gender’	  and/or	  ‘gendered’	  behaviour2	  
are	  based	  on	  binary	  categories.	  However,	  individual	  theories	  of	  biologically	  based	  gender	  are	  
not	  necessarily	  bound	  to	  rigid	  disciplinary	  definitions	  or	  categories	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992).	  
Hence	  theories	  presented	  within	  this	  section	  do	  vary	  from	  one	  another,	  in	  some	  cases	  quite	  
dramatically.	  Each	  area	  of	  biologically	  based	  gender	  research	  argues	  varying	  levels	  of	  
biological	  significance,	  and	  varying	  degrees	  of	  how	  it	  mediates	  gender	  formation.	  	  
	  
Ultimately,	  biological	  theory	  draws	  upon	  conclusions	  that	  prioritise	  biological	  methodology,	  
differing	  dramatically	  from	  a	  uniquely	  social	  approach	  to	  gender	  concepts	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  
1999).	  While	  biological	  understandings	  of	  gender	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  physical	  body	  and	  
the	  mechanisms	  that	  operate	  within	  biology,	  biology	  struggles	  to	  explain	  gender	  as	  socially	  
understood	  (the	  primary	  understandings	  held	  by	  most	  of	  society).	  Biology	  primarily	  comes	  
from	  an	  ontological	  position	  that	  endeavours	  to	  explain	  reality.	  	  
	  
Maturation	  
Maturation	  refers	  to	  the	  ordering	  of	  bodily	  changes	  (including	  those	  of	  the	  brain)	  from	  
conception	  through	  to	  adulthood.	  Although	  the	  types	  of	  maturation	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  standard	  
among	  individuals,	  there	  is	  some	  variation	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  (Gottesman	  &	  Hanson,	  2005).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Behaviour that is compatible with cultural expectations is referred to as gender-normative; behaviours that are 
viewed as incompatible with these expectations constitute gender non-conformity. 
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Adolescence	  is	  a	  significant	  milestone	  in	  maturation,	  recognised	  as	  the	  biological	  onset	  of	  
puberty	  and	  occurring	  predominantly	  during	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  10	  and	  13	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  
1999).	  This	  period	  of	  maturation	  brings	  on	  multiple	  anatomical	  and	  physiological	  changes	  and	  
often	  initiates	  an	  increase	  in	  sexual	  and	  aggressive	  drives.	  Maturation	  is	  described	  as	  relying	  
heavily	  on	  genetic	  codes	  in	  the	  human	  body	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Although	  it	  is	  claimed	  
that	  maturation	  is	  a	  biological	  signifier	  of	  gender,	  most	  aspects	  of	  maturation	  are	  better	  
explained	  as	  epigenetic	  (discussed	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  Three).	  	  
	  
Developmental	  studies	  indicate	  that	  fundamental	  differences	  in	  male	  and	  female	  cerebral	  
maturation	  may	  help	  to	  account	  for	  the	  sex	  differences	  observed	  in	  adulthood	  (Kolb	  &	  
Whishaw,	  1999).	  For	  example,	  female	  children	  speak	  earlier,	  enunciate	  language	  better	  and	  
reach	  brain	  asymmetry	  before	  male	  children	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  On	  average,	  girls	  also	  
physically	  mature	  at	  a	  much	  earlier	  age	  than	  boys	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Interestingly,	  
studies	  show	  that	  the	  more	  slowly	  a	  child	  matures,	  the	  greater	  the	  observed	  asymmetry.	  A	  
study	  by	  Waber	  (1976)	  demonstrates	  this	  finding.	  She	  reported	  that,	  regardless	  of	  sex,	  early-­‐
maturing	  adolescents	  performed	  better	  on	  tests	  of	  verbal	  abilities	  than	  spatial	  ones,	  whereas	  
late-­‐maturing	  adolescents	  did	  the	  opposite.	  This	  study	  suggests	  that	  maturation	  rate	  may	  
affect	  the	  organisation	  of	  cortical	  function	  (Waber,	  1976).	  	  
	  
Maturation	  studies	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  that	  biology	  is	  connected	  to	  structural	  changes	  and	  
to	  the	  cellular	  processes	  that	  underlie	  the	  male	  and	  female	  brains	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  
The	  studies	  described	  show	  that	  cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  changes	  occurring	  throughout	  
childhood	  and	  adolescence	  are	  to	  some	  degree	  biologically	  variable	  based	  on	  sex	  
categorisation	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  gender	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  However,	  what	  these	  
studies	  do	  not	  explain	  is	  why	  these	  changes	  occur	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  an	  individual’s	  
environment	  or	  the	  process	  of	  socialisation	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  biological	  processes	  of	  the	  
brain.	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Hormonal	  Effect	  on	  Cerebral	  Function:	  Linking	  Gendered	  Behaviour	  	  
Hormonal	  effects	  on	  cerebral	  function	  are	  another	  way	  of	  explaining	  sex	  differentiation.	  
Neurological	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  cerebral	  organisation	  differs	  between	  males	  and	  females	  
(Baron-­‐Cohen,	  2002,	  2003;	  Brizendeno,	  2007).	  Baron-­‐Cohen’s	  (2002,	  2003)	  theory	  claims	  that	  
male	  and	  female	  brains	  are	  essentially	  organised	  differently,	  with	  women	  more	  likely	  to	  
perform	  better	  on	  empathising	  tasks	  and	  men	  more	  capable	  of	  systematising	  tasks.	  This	  
differing	  organisation	  is	  explained	  as	  connected	  to	  both	  reproductive	  and	  non-­‐reproductive	  
behaviour	  patterns	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Analyses	  of	  sex-­‐linked	  differences	  that	  focus	  on	  
the	  hormonal	  influences	  observe	  how	  hormone	  levels	  alter	  gender	  behaviour,	  linking	  
behaviour	  patterns	  with	  particular	  hormones	  and	  comparing	  that	  information	  with	  detected	  
hormone	  levels	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Gonadal	  hormones3	  have	  an	  inductive	  or	  organising	  
effect	  on	  the	  brain	  and	  behavioural	  development,	  and	  this	  process	  is	  said	  to	  lead	  to	  sex	  
differentiation	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  	  
	  
Testosterone	  is	  a	  hormone	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘male’	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  present	  in	  both	  male	  
and	  female	  bodies,	  but	  in	  varying	  levels.	  Neuroscientific	  research	  has	  historically	  argued	  that	  
testosterone	  might	  affect	  cognition	  in	  adults	  that	  leads	  to	  recognised	  sex-­‐differentiation.	  
Janowsky,	  Oviatt,	  and	  Orwoll	  (1994)	  gave	  retired	  men	  testosterone	  (or	  a	  placebo)	  in	  scrotal	  
patches	  and	  found	  a	  significant	  improvement	  in	  performance	  of	  optical	  tasks	  but	  not	  in	  verbal	  
or	  other	  cognitive	  measures.	  Another	  study	  looking	  at	  hormone	  levels,	  conducted	  by	  Hampson	  
and	  Kimura	  (1992),	  showed	  that	  monthly	  fluctuations	  in	  women	  with	  low	  estradiol	  levels	  
were	  correlated	  with	  improved	  spatial	  performance.	  In	  summary,	  there	  is	  no	  question	  that	  
gonadal	  hormones	  have	  some	  effect	  on	  development	  and	  function,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  resounding	  
evidence	  to	  suggest	  how	  this	  is	  connected	  to	  sex	  differentiation	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Steroid hormones produced by the gonads. They stimulate reproductive organs, germ cell maturation and the 
secondary sex characteristics in males and females. The major sex steroid hormones include estradiol, 
progesterone and testosterone (Pub Med, 2015). 
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Dabbs,	  Carr,	  Frady	  and	  Riad	  (1995)	  and	  Sanchez-­‐Martin	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  observed	  relationships	  
between	  hormone	  levels	  and	  behaviours.	  Both	  studies	  looked	  primarily	  at	  gender-­‐specific	  
behavioural	  characteristics	  (aggression	  and	  risk-­‐taking,	  respectively).	  Dabbs	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  
studied	  two	  groups	  of	  prisoners,	  measuring	  testosterone	  levels	  in	  the	  saliva	  of	  692	  adult	  male	  
prisoners.	  Their	  research	  showed	  that	  the	  prisoners	  who	  had	  committed	  crimes	  of	  sex	  and	  
violence	  had	  higher	  testosterone	  levels	  than	  inmates	  who	  had	  committed	  non-­‐violent	  crimes.	  
Dabbs	  &	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  concluded	  that	  testosterone	  was	  connected	  to	  aggression	  and	  sex	  crimes.	  
Other	  works,	  including	  studies	  of	  females	  performing	  violent	  crimes,	  also	  conclude	  that	  
testosterone	  levels	  are	  connected	  to	  violence	  in	  both	  males	  and	  females,	  suggesting	  that	  
hormone	  levels	  alter	  behavioural	  characteristics	  across	  all	  genders	  (Dabbs,	  Dabbs,	  &	  Hargove,	  
1996;	  Dabbs,	  Ruback,	  Frady,	  Hopper,	  &	  Sgoutas,	  1988;	  Dabbs,	  Jurkovic,	  &	  Frady,	  1991).	  
	  
Similar	  findings	  emerged	  in	  a	  study	  of	  preschoolers	  in	  Spain.	  Sanchez-­‐Martin	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  
studied	  28	  male	  and	  20	  female	  preschoolers.	  The	  researchers	  videotaped	  the	  preschoolers	  
during	  free	  play,	  evaluated	  their	  levels	  of	  aggression	  during	  the	  social	  and	  play	  situations,	  and	  
measured	  their	  levels	  of	  salivary	  testosterone	  (Sanchez-­‐Martin	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Analysis	  of	  the	  
data,	  the	  researchers	  say,	  revealed	  a	  positive	  correlation	  in	  boys	  (but	  not	  girls)	  between	  
testosterone	  levels	  and	  dangerous	  aggression	  in	  social	  situations,	  but	  no	  correlation	  with	  
playful	  aggression	  (Sanchez-­‐Martin	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Sanchez-­‐Martin	  (2000)	  and	  colleagues	  
concluded	  that	  ‘testosterone	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  biological	  marker	  for	  serious	  aggression’	  (p.	  783).	  
	  
A	  study	  conducted	  by	  Zhou,	  Hofman,	  Gooren	  and	  Swaab	  (1997)	  located	  an	  area	  of	  the	  brain	  
that	  indicates	  how	  female	  identity	  occurs.	  Collecting	  data	  over	  an	  11-­‐year	  period,	  they	  
observed	  the	  hypothalamus	  of	  six	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  transgender	  people	  receiving	  hormones	  
during	  transgender	  transition4,	  searching	  for	  sexually	  dimorphic	  brain	  structure	  (Zhou	  et	  al.,	  
1997).	  Their	  research	  found	  a	  female	  brain	  structure	  in	  genetically	  M	  to	  F	  transgender	  people,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The transition from an individual’s birth gender to another gender — for example, from male to female or 
female to male. 
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supporting	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  gender	  identity	  develops	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  interaction	  between	  
the	  developing	  brain	  and	  sex	  hormones.	  This	  research	  hypothesised	  that	  transgender	  
formation	  occurs	  when	  hormones	  released	  into	  the	  brain	  soon	  after	  birth	  match	  those	  
typically	  released	  by	  the	  opposite	  birth	  sex	  (Zhou	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  This	  research	  is	  valuable	  to	  a	  
discussion	  of	  gender	  because	  it	  acknowledges	  variation	  and	  also	  suggests	  that	  gender	  
formation	  occurs	  as	  an	  interaction	  between	  biology	  and	  environment	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  
inherent	  mechanism.	  
	  
Although	  the	  studies	  that	  identify	  the	  hormone	  testosterone	  are	  used	  as	  indicators	  of	  sex-­‐
differentiation,	  all	  individuals	  have	  varying	  levels	  of	  testosterone	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  
including	  competition,	  stress	  or	  excitement.	  Due	  to	  unstable	  levels	  of	  hormones,	  individuals	  
are	  likely	  to	  produce	  unreliable	  characteristics	  (Israel,	  1997).	  It	  could	  therefore	  be	  suggested	  
that	  studies	  identifying	  testosterone	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  aggression	  linked	  to	  masculine	  gender	  
behaviour	  are	  misleading.	  Research	  that	  specifically	  looks	  for	  a	  correlation	  between	  
aggression	  and	  testosterone	  levels	  relies	  on	  socially	  attributed	  differences	  between	  the	  sexes	  
(Glaser	  &	  Dimitrakakis, 2013).	  Alternatively,	  an	  investigation	  indicates	  that	  introduced	  
testosterone	  can	  aromatise	  to	  the	  estrogen	  estradiol	  (Giammanco,	  Tabacchi,	  Giammanco,	  Di	  
Majo,	  &	  La	  Guardia,	  2005),	  suggesting	  that	  estrogens	  may	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  aggression	  
and	  hostility,	  and	  thus	  contradicting	  testosterone-­‐based	  gender	  research	  (Giammanco	  et	  al.,	  
2005).	  	  
	  
Although	  transitional	  F	  to	  M	  individuals	  have	  reported	  higher	  levels	  of	  aggression	  than	  before	  
testosterone	  treatment,	  scientific	  research	  overall	  does	  not	  support	  the	  theory	  that	  
testosterone,	  as	  a	  specific	  hormone,	  causes	  aggression	  (O’Connor	  et.	  al.,	  2004;	  Giammanco	  et	  
al.,	  2005).	  Evidence	  collected	  during	  transition	  shows	  that	  mood	  changes	  experienced	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  increased	  levels	  of	  testosterone	  occur	  not	  because	  of	  the	  testosterone	  but	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  adjusting	  to	  new	  levels	  of	  hormones	  in	  the	  body	  (Giammanco	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  This	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explanation	  also	  correlates	  with	  research	  on	  menopausal	  women,	  who	  can	  be	  given	  either	  
testosterone	  or	  estrogen	  to	  alleviate	  drops	  or	  increases	  of	  hormones	  in	  the	  body	  (Giammanco	  
et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  research	  found	  that	  either	  hormone	  produced	  aggression	  and	  stress	  
indicators	  in	  individuals.	  
	  
The	  significance	  of	  this	  research	  for	  understanding	  gender	  is	  that	  it	  illuminates	  the	  
contribution	  of	  cultural	  meanings	  associated	  with	  behavioural	  characteristics	  and	  how	  these	  
are	  defined	  and	  identified	  as	  binary	  assumptions	  that	  fit	  neatly	  within	  traditional	  linear	  
expectations	  of	  testosterone	  as	  a	  male	  hormone	  that	  legitimates	  aggressive	  tendencies	  versus	  
estrogens	  as	  the	  emotional	  or	  sensitive	  hormone	  (Glaser	  &	  Dimitrakakis, 2013).	  
	  
Genetic	  Sex-­‐Linkage	  	  
In	  theories	  preferring	  biological	  determinants,	  genetics	  are	  responsible	  for	  transferring	  gender	  
differentiation	  across	  generations.	  Sex-­‐linked	  genetic	  research	  identifies	  gender	  
characteristics	  through	  observations	  of	  genetic	  components	  and	  mechanisms	  (Kolb	  &	  
Whishaw,	  1999).	  For	  example,	  researchers	  compare	  individuals’	  genes	  and,	  at	  the	  epigenetic5	  
level,	  they	  look	  for	  modifications	  of	  biological	  components	  in	  conjunction	  with	  environmental	  
and	  external	  influences	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Epigenetics	  is	  the	  study	  of	  how	  experiences,	  
environmental	  factors	  and	  exposures	  alter	  genetic	  expression,	  and	  is	  an	  area	  of	  post-­‐genomic	  
life-­‐science	  research	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  The	  study	  of	  sex-­‐linked	  genetic	  
components	  includes	  sex	  chromosome	  abnormalities	  and	  sexual	  ambiguity;	  behavioural	  
genetics	  pertaining	  to	  sexuality	  and	  gender;	  gender	  differences	  between	  male	  and	  female	  
genetic	  carriers;	  and	  sex	  selection	  (WHO,	  2015).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The term ‘epigenetics’ is defined literally as ‘in addition to genetics’ but in reality refers to changes in the DNA 
or surrounding chromatin that influence gene expression but do not change genetic composition (Goldberg, 
2007). 
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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  genetic	  theories	  that	  identify	  gender	  characteristics	  
assume	  each	  individual	  has	  a	  particular	  sex	  that	  can	  be	  determined	  either	  through	  
chromosomal	  identification	  or	  visual	  recognition	  of	  anatomical	  structures	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  
1999).	  Some	  authors	  have	  proposed	  that	  the	  significant	  factor	  in	  determining	  variation	  is	  
genetic,	  with	  most	  suggesting	  that	  a	  recessive	  gene	  on	  the	  X	  (female)	  chromosome	  is	  
responsible,	  although	  Boles	  (1980)	  concludes	  that	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  proven.	  	  
	  
Genetic	  Chromosomal	  Assessment:	  Gendered	  Beginnings	  
In	  medical	  practice,	  it	  is	  standard	  procedure	  to	  biologically	  analyse	  the	  unborn	  child	  to	  assess	  
that	  it	  is	  forming	  correctly	  in	  alignment	  with	  medical	  understandings	  (this	  includes	  anatomical	  
sex	  organs).	  Antenatal	  screening	  is	  used	  to	  measure	  genetics	  before	  a	  child	  is	  born.	  Antenatal	  
screening	  is	  performed	  during	  pregnancy	  to	  identify	  people	  with	  a	  genetic	  risk,	  or	  a	  risk	  of	  
having	  a	  child	  with	  a	  congenital	  or	  genetic	  disorder	  (WHO,	  2012).	  Three	  antenatal	  screening	  
methods	  are	  widely	  used:	  biochemical	  screening,	  ultrasound	  and	  genetic	  screening	  (WHO,	  
2012).	  
	  
Ultrasound	  and	  biochemical	  screening	  are	  used	  to	  identify	  sex	  but,	  because	  they	  cannot	  
provide	  certainty,	  genetic	  screening	  is	  used	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  provide	  chromosomal	  
information	  collected	  from	  an	  amniotic	  fluid	  sample	  (WHO,	  2012).	  Significance	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  
child’s	  genetics	  because	  they	  hold	  information	  about	  inheritance	  and	  genetic	  traits	  that	  may	  
prove	  useful	  in	  identifying	  health	  issues.	  Sex-­‐linked	  genetic	  screening	  processes	  create	  specific	  
social	  and	  biological	  understandings	  of	  sex	  and	  other	  chromosomal	  information	  (Chiñas,	  
1995).	  Chromosomal	  identification	  is	  xx	  for	  females	  and	  xy	  for	  males	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000).	  
Although	  chromosomal	  information	  may	  identify	  that	  an	  individual	  is	  a	  male	  or	  a	  female,	  this	  
information	  does	  not	  indicate	  intersexuality	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000).	  Intersexuality	  is	  often	  not	  
known	  until	  birth	  because	  it	  is	  ‘genital	  ambiguity	  in	  newborns,	  infants	  born	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	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both	  female	  and	  male	  anatomy,	  or	  genitals	  that	  appear	  different	  than	  their	  chromosomal	  sex’	  
(Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000,	  p.	  19).	  	  
	  
Sex-­‐linked	  Genetics:	  Evolutionary	  Theory	  and	  Psychology	  
The	  formation	  of	  sex-­‐linked	  characteristics	  has	  traditionally	  been	  coupled	  to	  evolutionary	  
explanations	  of	  gender	  formation.	  Concurring	  with	  deterministic	  development	  theory,	  
evolutionary	  theorists	  argue	  that	  gender	  differences	  arise	  from	  the	  different	  biological	  roles	  
inherent	  to	  humans,	  where	  roles	  in	  reproduction	  underlie	  gender-­‐role	  development	  and	  
differentiation	  (Buss,	  1989;	  Trivers,	  1972).	  Not	  all	  evolutionary	  theorists	  characterise	  
behavioural	  traits	  as	  universal	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  1999),	  but	  because	  the	  discipline	  is	  essentialist,	  
many	  traditional	  versions	  of	  evolutionary	  theory	  do	  claim	  that	  qualities	  are	  inherent	  because	  
you	  are	  born	  with	  certain	  characteristics.	  For	  example,	  evolutionary	  theorists	  would	  hold	  that	  
the	  female	  sex	  is	  born	  with	  feminine	  characteristics	  (Buss,	  1989;	  Trivers,	  1972).	  Evolutionary	  
models	  suggest	  that	  men	  and	  women	  developed	  various	  characteristics	  and	  behavioural	  
tendencies	  over	  time	  in	  order	  to	  maximise	  survival	  and	  quality	  of	  life,	  especially	  during	  early	  
periods	  of	  human	  history.	  More	  specifically,	  evolutionary	  theorists	  suggest	  that	  behavioural	  
differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  are	  evolved	  adaptations	  to	  biological	  sexual	  difference	  
(Buss,	  1989;	  Buss	  &	  Schmitt,	  2011).	  	  
	  
The	  origin	  of	  differences	  in	  evolutionary-­‐based	  gender	  roles	  is	  examined	  in	  terms	  of	  mate	  
preferences,	  reproductive	  strategies,	  parental	  investment	  in	  offspring	  and	  the	  aggressiveness	  
of	  males	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  1999).	  Viewed	  from	  this	  perspective,	  contemporary	  gender	  
differences	  are	  inherent	  and	  originate	  from	  successful	  ancestral	  adaptation	  to	  the	  different	  
reproductive	  demands	  men	  and	  women	  faced	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  1999).	  Theorists	  using	  this	  
model	  tend	  to	  emphasise	  functional	  relations	  between	  an	  organism	  and	  its	  environment	  that	  
emphasise	  the	  diversifying	  influence	  of	  variant	  ecological	  contexts	  (Berlucchi	  &	  Aglioti,	  1997).	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In	  contrast,	  Buss	  (1989)	  suggests	  that	  gender	  differences	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  different	  
physiological	  roles	  enacted	  by	  males	  and	  females	  in	  reproduction,	  which	  produce	  particular	  
kinds	  of	  gender-­‐role	  development	  and	  differentiation	  (Buss,	  1989).	  This	  study	  examined	  a	  
variety	  of	  cultures	  to	  identify	  what	  women	  and	  men	  look	  for	  in	  a	  potential	  mate	  (Buss,	  1989).	  
They	  found	  that	  men	  consistently	  prioritised	  youth	  and	  physical	  attractiveness,	  whereas	  
women	  valued	  wealth	  and	  status	  (Buss,	  1989).	  Buss	  suggests	  that	  these	  values	  may	  reflect	  
biological	  differences	  between	  women	  and	  men	  that	  have	  ascended	  from	  evolutionary	  
processes	  (Buss,	  1989).	  	  
	  
In	  Buss	  and	  Schmitt	  (2011),	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  ‘Evolutionary	  psychology	  is	  a	  hybrid	  discipline	  
that	  draws	  insights	  from	  modern	  evolutionary	  theory,	  biology,	  cognitive	  psychology,	  and	  
anthropology’	  (p.	  1).	  This	  extension	  of	  traditional	  evolutionary	  theory	  explains	  gendered	  
behaviour	  as	  contingent	  on	  ‘psychological	  mechanisms,	  information	  processing	  devices	  
housed	  in	  the	  brain,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  external	  and	  internal	  inputs	  —	  social,	  cultural,	  
ecological,	  physiological’	  (Buss	  &	  Schmitt,	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  indicate	  that	  it	  is	  
essential	  to	  view	  these	  factors	  as	  interacting	  to	  produce	  and	  manifest	  gendered	  behaviour.	  
They	  defend	  evolution	  as	  a	  method	  of	  understanding	  gender,	  claiming	  that	  it	  provides	  insight	  
into	  causal	  processes	  capable	  of	  creating	  ‘such	  complex	  organic	  mechanisms	  (adaptations)’	  
(Buss	  &	  Schmitt,	  2011).	  They	  explicitly	  rationalise	  that	  gendered	  behaviour	  cannot	  be	  
‘genetically	  determined’	  because	  environmental	  ‘input’	  is	  an	  essential	  mediator	  of	  ‘every	  step	  
in	  the	  causal	  chain’	  (Buss	  &	  Schmitt,	  2011).	  	  
	  
In	  comparison	  to	  the	  deterministic	  view	  of	  gender,	  biological	  evolutionist	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  
(1993;	  2000b)	  emphasises	  functional	  relations	  between	  an	  organism	  and	  its	  environment,	  
showing	  how	  variant	  ecological	  contexts	  influence	  diversity	  within	  adaption.	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  
(1992,	  1993,	  2000)	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  meanings	  are	  embedded	  in	  
biological	  expectations,	  precluding	  genuine	  empirical	  discoveries	  of	  biological	  sex	  and	  gender.	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Evolutionary	  theory	  illuminates	  that	  some	  gendered	  differences	  may	  reflect	  biological	  
differences	  between	  women	  and	  men	  that	  have	  arisen	  because	  of	  evolutionary	  processes.	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  considerable	  differences	  between	  some	  
cultures	  in	  their	  gender	  behaviour.	  This	  suggests	  that	  even	  though	  biological	  factors	  influence	  
gender	  behaviour,	  they	  are	  heavily	  modified	  through	  interaction	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  
everyday	  mediators	  like	  environment	  and	  socialisation.	  Thus,	  evolutionary	  theory	  can	  provide	  
only	  a	  limited	  picture	  of	  gender	  formation	  because	  it	  obscures	  the	  mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  
social	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  (Ah-­‐King,	  2007).	  It	  is	  often	  critiqued	  for	  the	  limited	  perspective	  of	  
gender	  it	  produces	  (Ah-­‐King,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Sex-­‐Linked	  Genetic	  Variance	  
Biologist	  Anne	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  (1992,	  1993,	  2000,	  2000b,	  2003)	  illuminates	  the	  importance	  of	  
genetic	  observations	  and	  adaptation	  to	  a	  dialogue	  about	  gender.	  Her	  work	  challenges	  
mainstream	  biological	  debates	  by	  indicating	  that	  natural	  diversity	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  
representations	  provide	  comparative	  analysis	  that	  supports	  legitimate	  diversity	  within	  gender	  
(1992,	  1993,	  2000b).	  She	  argues,	  ‘discrete	  buckets	  —	  like	  “nature”	  or	  “nurture”,	  “boy”	  or	  “girl”	  
are	  too	  simplistic	  for	  the	  inherent	  messiness	  found	  in	  nature’	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000b)	  Her	  
main	  argument	  is	  that	  her	  observations	  have	  shown	  new	  expressions	  of	  ‘sex’	  types	  that	  
demonstrate	  current	  sex	  definitions	  are	  inadequate	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000b).	  She	  suggests	  that	  
biologically	  ‘there	  are	  many	  gradations	  running	  from	  female	  to	  male;	  and	  depending	  on	  how	  
one	  calls	  the	  shots,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  along	  that	  spectrum	  lie	  at	  least	  five	  sexes	  —	  and	  
perhaps	  even	  more’	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1993,	  p.	  20).	  	  
	  
Fausto-­‐Sterling	  considers	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  intersexual	  body	  is	  paramount	  to	  extending	  
gender	  explanation	  (1992,	  1993).	  She	  argues	  that	  terminologies	  to	  explain	  intersex	  bodies	  are	  
limited	  to	  a	  ‘catch-­‐all	  for	  three	  major	  subgroups	  with	  some	  mixture	  of	  male	  and	  female	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characteristics’	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1993,	  p.	  21).	  She	  introduces	  a	  new	  selection	  of	  sex	  
identifications:	  ‘the	  “so-­‐called	  true	  hermaphrodites”	  are	  “herms”	  (who	  possess	  one	  testis	  and	  
one	  ovary),	  the	  “male	  pseudohermaphrodites”	  are	  “merms”	  (who	  have	  testes	  and	  some	  aspects	  
of	  the	  female	  genitalia	  but	  no	  ovaries),	  and	  the	  “female	  pseudohermaphrodites”	  are	  “ferms”	  
(who	  have	  ovaries	  and	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  male	  genitalia	  but	  lack	  testes)’	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  
1993,	  p.	  21).	  Her	  work	  maintains	  that	  if	  there	  are	  more	  varieties	  of	  bodies,	  our	  understandings	  
of	  gender	  should	  also	  expand	  both	  biologically	  and	  socially	  (1992,	  1993,	  2000,	  2000b).	  
	  
Fausto-­‐Sterling’s	  (1992)	  conceptualisation	  of	  gender	  is	  valuable	  because	  it	  challenges	  current	  
biological	  understandings	  from	  within	  a	  biological	  epistemology,	  describing	  gender	  as	  
constrained	  by	  masculine	  or	  feminine	  understandings.	  She	  also	  highlights	  that	  anatomical	  sex	  
does	  not	  align	  on	  a	  continuum	  with	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  genders	  and	  that	  a	  more	  adequate	  
explanation	  of	  gender	  must	  consider	  vibrational	  ‘points	  in	  a	  multidimensional	  space’	  (Fausto-­‐	  
Sterling,	  1992,	  p.	  22),	  meaning	  that	  gender	  does	  not	  remain	  static	  or	  one-­‐dimensional.	  	  
	  
Although	  genetic	  sex-­‐linkage	  studies	  are	  helpful	  for	  explaining	  that	  chromosomal	  and	  
hormonal	  differences	  between	  males	  and	  females	  alter	  a	  range	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  
behaviours,	  they	  do	  not	  describe	  a	  range	  of	  additional	  factors	  including	  environment	  and	  
culture.	  	  
	  
Critique:	  Biological	  Limitations	  
Biological	  theories	  have	  significant	  limitations.	  For	  example,	  they	  can	  be	  too	  deterministic	  and	  
they	  don’t	  always	  recognise	  contextual	  processes.	  Critiques	  of	  evolutionary	  theory	  argue	  that	  
it	  is	  common	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  ‘reproductive	  competition’	  to	  be	  masculinised,	  leading	  to	  the	  
assumption	  that	  females	  are	  ‘receptive’	  to	  an	  aggressive	  male	  sex	  (Haraway,	  1989;	  Carubia,	  
1998),	  which	  also	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  constructions	  of	  scientific	  human	  nature	  accounts	  
that	  are	  focused	  on	  primates	  (Haraway,	  1989,	  1991).	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Another	  shortcoming	  of	  biological	  theories	  is	  that	  many	  of	  them	  are	  reductionist,	  over-­‐
simplifying	  the	  complexities	  of	  physical	  systems	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment	  
(Richardson,	  2014).	  A	  necessary	  criticism	  of	  biological	  explanations	  of	  gender	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  traits	  are	  based	  on	  social	  constructions	  rather	  than	  biological	  
processes	  (Butler,	  1994;	  Lorber,	  1993,	  1994;	  Overall,	  2009).	  Some	  biological-­‐based	  theorists	  
also	  argue	  that	  biological	  findings	  are	  influenced	  by	  predisposed	  assumptions	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  
be	  a	  male	  or	  female	  human	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000b;	  Kessler,	  2002).	  The	  historical	  focus	  on	  
explaining	  reality	  and	  the	  institutional	  epistemological	  position	  of	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo	  
both	  alter	  the	  way	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  produced	  and	  the	  type	  of	  results	  that	  are	  interpreted	  
(Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2003;	  Richardson,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
As	  shown,	  theories	  that	  represent	  gender	  as	  primarily	  biological	  vary	  in	  how	  rigidly	  they	  align	  
gender	  with	  sex	  identification,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  genders	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  purely	  biological	  
phenomena.	  However,	  biological	  theories	  do	  typically	  argue	  that	  gender	  is	  an	  integral	  
component	  of	  the	  biological	  body,	  and	  of	  the	  way	  individuals	  perceive,	  reenact	  and	  interpret	  
understandings	  of	  their	  biological	  sex.	  Gender	  as	  biology	  is	  complex	  and	  not	  easily	  reconciled	  
as	  a	  singular	  theory.	  Biological	  theory	  is	  useful	  to	  provide	  a	  counter-­‐argument	  to	  nurture	  or	  
socially	  constructed	  theories	  of	  gender,	  enabling	  discussion.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  
divides	  between	  biological	  theory	  and	  other	  theoretical	  conceptions	  of	  gender.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  means	  of	  expressing	  gender	  variations,	  biology	  is	  limiting,	  and	  yet	  biology	  may	  be	  able	  to	  
liberate	  new	  understandings	  of	  gender.	  The	  human	  body	  is	  innately	  connected	  to	  aspects	  of	  
gendered	  experience,	  but	  this	  connection	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  mediating	  rather	  than	  deterministic.	  
Beyond	  authoritative	  scientific	  language	  and	  its	  implied	  legitimacy,	  there	  is	  an	  undeniable	  
relationship	  between	  biological	  and	  socially	  constructed	  aspects	  of	  gender.	  However,	  it	  is	  hard	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to	  resolve	  gender	  formation	  if	  you	  consider	  these	  concepts	  as	  opposing	  one	  another.	  As	  
theorists	  move	  away	  from	  traditional	  deterministic	  evolutionary	  theories,	  new	  understandings	  
that	  acknowledge	  the	  meanings	  embedded	  in	  biological	  assumptions	  offer	  more	  genuine	  
empirical	  findings	  and	  understandings	  of	  biological	  sex	  and	  gender.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  completely	  
resolve	  what	  mediates	  gender	  formation	  through	  a	  biological	  lens	  without	  considering	  how	  
biology	  interacts	  with	  the	  social	  world.	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CHAPTER	  THREE:	  THE	  SOCIAL	  CONSTRUCTION	  OF	  GENDER	  
	  
Introduction	  	  
This	  section	  considers	  how	  theorists	  have	  come	  to	  understand	  social	  constructionism.	  It	  
examines	  various	  related	  approaches	  to	  gender	  that	  address	  concerns	  that	  can	  be	  termed	  
social	  constructionist.	  Such	  approaches	  describe	  gender	  as	  learned	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  explain	  
gender	  socialisation	  as	  showing	  that	  gender	  operates	  at	  many	  levels,	  including	  social,	  cultural,	  
economic,	  institutional,	  interpersonal	  and	  emotional	  (Connell,	  1992;	  Haraway,	  1991;	  Prevs,	  
2003).	  Social	  constructionism	  holds	  that	  meaning	  is	  created	  and	  negotiated	  by	  human	  actors	  
(Götschel,	  2011).	  Social	  constructionist	  gender	  theories	  emphasise	  language	  and	  interaction	  as	  
mediators	  of	  meaning.	  Such	  theories	  argue	  that	  gender	  serves	  a	  social	  function,	  being	  designed	  
to	  meet	  the	  needs,	  values	  and	  interests	  of	  society	  (Marecek,	  Crawford,	  &	  Popp,	  2004).	  The	  
theories	  also	  convey	  that	  gender	  concepts,	  however	  socially	  constructed,	  correspond	  to	  real	  
things	  in	  the	  world	  that	  are	  reflected	  in	  our	  knowledge	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2003).	  Social	  
constructionism	  is	  the	  epistemological	  ‘view	  that	  all	  knowledge,	  and	  therefore	  all	  meaningful	  
reality	  as	  such,	  is	  contingent	  upon	  human	  practices,	  being	  constructed	  in	  and	  out	  of	  interaction	  
between	  human	  beings	  and	  their	  world,	  and	  developed	  and	  transmitted	  within	  an	  essentially	  
social	  context’	  (Crotty,	  1998,	  p.	  42).	  	  
	  
Social	  constructionism	  emphasises	  the	  cultural	  and	  institutional	  origins	  of	  meaning	  (Salih,	  
2002).	  Gender	  categories	  are	  established	  by	  society,	  and	  each	  person	  fits	  into	  these	  different	  
categories.	  For	  example,	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  aspects	  of	  gender	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  any	  natural	  
bodily	  capacity;	  conceptually	  they	  belong	  to	  meanings	  attached	  to	  the	  social	  agreements	  that	  
govern	  human	  structures	  and	  systems	  (Ryle,	  2014).	  The	  constructionist	  debate	  suggests	  that	  
social	  meanings	  have	  created	  fundamentally	  understood	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  
that	  are	  perceived	  as	  real,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  belief	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  biological	  gender	  
categories	  identified	  as	  male	  and	  female	  (Franklin,	  2012;	  Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992,	  1993;	  Lorber,	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1994).	  These	  views	  are	  so	  socially	  entrenched	  that	  they	  are	  maintained	  even	  when	  the	  
evidence	  of	  intersexed	  individuals	  contradicts	  that	  reality	  (Chiñas,	  1995;	  Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  
1992).	  In	  social	  constructionism,	  ‘the	  world	  and	  the	  things	  in	  it	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  not	  only	  social	  
constructions,	  but	  also	  “crucial	  participants”	  in	  the	  meaning	  making	  process’	  (Crotty,	  1998,	  p.	  
42).	  	  
	  
Because	  scholars	  have	  various	  ways	  of	  discussing	  gender	  as	  socially	  constructed,	  this	  chapter	  
will	  explore	  a	  range	  of	  these	  understandings	  to	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  conceptualising	  gender	  
through	  this	  approach.	  Most	  importantly,	  theories	  of	  socially	  constructed	  gender	  discuss	  the	  
elements	  of	  reality	  that	  create	  and	  represent	  differences	  between	  males	  and	  females,	  and	  all	  
others	  who	  fall	  outside	  the	  constraints	  of	  sex	  or	  gender	  categorisation	  (Lorber,	  1994).	  Social	  
constructionism	  enables	  focused	  descriptions	  of	  how	  gender	  is	  culturally	  meaningful	  as	  a	  tool	  
that	  creates	  and	  maintains	  social	  roles	  and	  positions	  (West	  &	  Zimmerman,	  1987).	  Social	  
construction	  illuminates	  that	  gender	  categories	  are	  formed	  through	  layers	  of	  culturally	  based	  
concepts	  and	  expectations	  (Butler,	  1990).	  The	  building	  of	  the	  gendered	  human	  being	  is	  a	  
multilayered	  process	  that	  involves	  roles,	  power	  over	  and	  empowerment,	  from	  the	  large	  
foundational	  structures	  that	  govern	  society	  through	  to	  the	  interpersonal	  elements	  of	  an	  
individual’s	  everyday	  position	  in	  life	  (Haraway,	  1989,	  1991).	  	  
	  	  
Socialisation	  
Gender,	  like	  other	  aspects	  of	  culture,	  is	  learned	  through	  socialisation	  (Giddens,	  2009).	  
Socialisation	  looks	  at	  how	  our	  individual	  formation,	  including	  our	  traits,	  behaviours	  and	  
attitudes,	  is	  shaped	  by	  social	  interaction	  with	  other	  individuals	  and	  groups	  (Giddens,	  2009).	  
Cooley’s	  (1902)	  ‘Looking	  Glass	  Self’	  theory	  of	  socialisation	  suggests	  that	  children	  gain	  an	  
impression	  of	  how	  others	  perceive	  their	  gender	  as	  they	  interact	  in	  social	  situations.	  
Essentially,	  the	  self	  is	  a	  social	  product	  —	  the	  structure	  and	  content	  of	  the	  self	  come	  from	  
society,	  represented	  by	  groups	  and	  institutions.	  In	  effect,	  children	  see	  their	  gendered	  selves	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interacting	  with	  other	  people	  as	  if	  they	  are	  looking	  in	  a	  mirror	  (Cooley,	  1902).	  As	  the	  child	  
matures,	  they	  use	  the	  perceptions	  that	  others	  have	  of	  their	  gender	  behaviours	  and	  actions	  to	  
develop	  judgments	  and	  feelings	  about	  themselves	  (Cooley,	  1902).	  
	  
Another	  example	  of	  socialisation	  theorised	  by	  Mead	  (1934)	  is	  that	  individuals	  learn	  gender	  
through	  a	  process	  described	  as	  ‘taking	  the	  role	  of	  the	  other’.	  Mead’s	  theory	  explains	  that	  
gender	  is	  learnt	  when	  children	  pretend	  to	  be	  other	  people	  in	  their	  imaginative	  play,	  which	  
creates	  a	  process	  where	  they	  learn	  what	  other	  people	  expect	  of	  gendered	  behaviour.	  Mead	  
described	  children	  as	  taking	  the	  role	  of	  significant	  others,	  typically	  parents	  and	  siblings,	  who	  
have	  the	  most	  contact	  with	  them.	  Then,	  as	  the	  child	  matures,	  they	  take	  on	  the	  gender	  roles	  of	  
others	  and	  internalise	  the	  expectations	  of	  influential	  others,	  or	  society	  itself	  (Mead,	  1934).	  	  
	  
Postmodern	  feminist	  Nancy	  ’s	  (1978)	  theory	  of	  socialisation	  argues	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  
‘mothering’	  as	  connected	  to	  gendered	  productions	  of	  identity.	  Chodorow	  (1978)	  claims	  that	  
gender	  awareness	  involves	  detailed	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  the	  monitoring	  of	  rules	  within	  systems	  
of	  socialisation.	  Chodorow’s	  theory	  emphasises	  the	  child’s	  developing	  sense	  of	  their	  gender	  
identity,	  which	  is	  described	  as	  closely	  linked	  to	  gender	  relations	  within	  the	  family.	  The	  child’s	  
gender	  forms	  though	  experiences	  of	  being	  mothered	  (Chodorow,	  1978).	  Chodorow	  (1978)	  
suggests	  that	  mothering	  is	  tied	  closely	  to	  patriarchal	  relations	  that	  reinforce	  the	  production	  
and	  reproduction	  of	  gender-­‐dominated	  roles	  and	  stereotypes.	  The	  process	  of	  mothering	  occurs	  
through	  the	  interpersonal	  and	  emotional	  bond	  that	  forms	  between	  the	  developing	  child	  and	  
their	  parents	  and,	  as	  such,	  is	  deeply	  intertwined	  with	  social	  and	  cultural	  expectations	  
(Chodorow,	  1978).	  The	  process	  of	  mothering	  the	  child	  provides	  the	  mechanism	  to	  reproduce	  
male	  and	  female	  personalities	  (Chodorow,	  1978).	  
	  
For	  Chodorow,	  the	  conflict	  between	  genders	  is	  the	  primary	  historical	  and	  social	  conflict,	  one	  
that	  has	  psychological	  roots	  reinforced	  by	  social	  practices	  (Beechey,	  1979,	  p.	  69).	  Chodorow’s	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theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  object-­‐relations	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  arguing	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
gendered	  self	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  child	  and	  their	  parents	  (Beechey,	  
1979).	  Critics	  of	  Chodorow’s	  (1978)	  theory	  argue	  that	  she	  does	  not	  address	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
identity	  and	  selfhood	  but	  rather	  focuses	  on	  how	  gender	  roles	  are	  reproduced	  (Rose,	  1983).	  
Chodorow’s	  (1978)	  theory	  is	  helpful	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  because	  it	  describes	  how	  the	  
formation	  of	  our	  personality	  and	  identity	  are	  embedded	  in	  everyday	  relationships.	  This	  helps	  
to	  illuminate	  that	  gender	  is	  mediated	  in	  part	  by	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  roles	  through	  personal	  
identification	  with	  other	  significant	  individuals.	  
	  
Like	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  identity,	  Lorber	  (1993,	  1994)	  argues	  that	  sex	  identity	  is	  acquired	  
through	  socialisation	  and	  ongoing	  relationships.	  In	  Lorber’s	  (1994)	  view,	  people	  produce	  their	  
identities	  within	  social	  interactions,	  and	  identity	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  production	  of	  status,	  
which	  reproduces	  the	  structure	  and	  constraints	  of	  their	  social	  world.	  Lorber	  (1993)	  explains	  
gender	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  social	  institution	  that	  shapes	  the	  choices,	  lifestyle	  and	  identity	  of	  most	  
individuals.	  Her	  theory	  highlights	  that	  labelling	  people	  as	  male	  and	  female	  determines	  the	  
ways	  individuals	  react	  and	  respond	  to	  social	  situations.	  Her	  work	  describes	  how	  gender	  
identity	  becomes	  intrinsic	  to	  our	  nature.	  In	  this	  way,	  gender	  not	  only	  constructs	  barriers	  but	  
also	  takes	  the	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  binary	  opposition	  of	  female	  vs.	  male	  (Lorber,	  1993).	  
Lorber	  (1993,	  1994)	  argues	  that	  our	  social	  understandings	  and	  all	  expectations	  of	  the	  
normative	  are	  gendered,	  therefore	  defining	  most	  areas	  of	  social	  life	  (1993,	  1994).	  She	  also	  
argues	  ‘that	  if	  gender	  is	  the	  component	  that	  alters	  expectations	  then	  all	  signs	  of	  alternative	  
concepts	  become	  obscured	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  not	  challenged	  as	  readily’	  (Lorber,	  1994,	  p.	  
1071).	  	  
	  
Postmodern	  Gender:	  Gender	  as	  a	  Social	  Institution	  
‘As	  a	  social	  institution,	  gender	  is	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  distinguishable	  social	  statuses	  for	  the	  
assignment	  of	  rights	  and	  responsibilities’	  (Lorber,	  1994.	  p.	  16).	  Postmodern	  ideas	  of	  gender	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have	  some	  key	  features	  and	  characteristics	  that	  differ	  from	  those	  of	  other	  theories.	  A	  key	  
feature	  of	  postmodernism	  is	  how	  it	  illuminates	  aspects	  of	  gender	  that	  become	  embedded	  in	  
everyday	  practices	  (Beechey,	  1979).	  As	  a	  result,	  most	  theories	  establish	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
‘perceive	  oneself,	  one’s	  family	  and	  group	  traditions’	  outside	  the	  norm	  ‘that	  shapes	  one’s	  notion	  
of	  the	  differences	  of	  others’	  (Lorber,	  1994,	  p.	  13).	  Attributed	  gender	  is	  therefore	  seen	  as	  
central	  to	  social	  systems	  and	  is	  institutionalised	  through	  social	  norms	  to	  control	  behaviour	  
(Westwood,	  2011).	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  structures	  of	  authority	  enable	  non-­‐equitable	  
classifications	  that	  divide	  people	  into	  groups,	  dehumanising	  people	  by	  turning	  them	  into	  
explainable	  categories	  (Lorber,	  1993).	  Individuals	  are	  described	  as	  ‘doing’,	  attaining,	  acquiring	  
or	  aspiring	  to	  their	  gendered	  identity	  (Chodorow,	  1978).	  And	  yet	  representations	  of	  gender	  
recognised	  by	  larger	  groups	  or	  institutions	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  individual	  experiences	  of	  
gender	  (Westwood,	  2011).	  The	  term	  ‘institutionalised’	  acknowledges	  that	  gender	  is	  a	  
mechanism	  that	  produces	  subjects	  or	  citizens	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  power	  (Butler,	  1990,	  2004;	  
Lorber,	  1993;	  Overall,	  2009;	  Foucault,	  1977;	  Westwood,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Gender	  as	  Accomplished	  
According	  to	  Garfinkel	  (1967),	  gender	  is	  something	  that	  has	  to	  be	  accomplished.	  He	  argues	  
that	  to	  recognise	  ourselves,	  we	  have	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  others	  as	  individuals	  of	  a	  certain	  
gender.	  His	  work	  claims	  that	  individuals	  embody	  the	  social	  characteristics	  associated	  with	  
masculinity	  and	  femininity	  that	  are	  understood	  representations	  of	  gender	  within	  the	  social	  
and	  cultural	  context.	  His	  work	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  no	  concept	  of	  the	  gendered	  identity	  
outside	  culture.	  Rather,	  gender	  is	  described	  as	  an	  accomplishment	  of	  an	  individual’s	  culture	  
and	  authorised	  social	  recognition,	  which	  reinforces	  an	  individual’s	  participation	  and	  inclusion	  
in	  their	  culture.	  He	  takes	  this	  concept	  further	  to	  propose	  that	  the	  process	  of	  identifying	  and	  
being	  identified	  by	  others	  requires	  us	  to	  ‘do’	  particular	  acts.	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Garfinkel’s	  concept	  of	  ‘gender	  as	  accomplished’	  is	  similar	  to	  Butler’s	  (1990,	  2004)	  
‘performativity’,	  but	  Butler's	  theory	  better	  explains	  the	  processes	  involved	  by	  extending	  the	  
concepts	  of	  ‘doing’	  and	  ‘performing’	  acts.	  Butler	  (1990)	  argues	  that	  ‘repetitions’	  of	  ‘gender	  
acts’	  respond	  to	  expectations	  of	  behaviour	  and	  performance	  rather	  than	  arising	  through	  
individual	  negotiation	  as	  described	  by	  Garfinkel	  (1967).	  Butler’s	  (1990,	  2004)	  theory	  
illuminates	  the	  way	  discourse	  creates	  meanings	  that	  are	  internalised	  through	  institutional	  
structures,	  showing	  how	  everything	  we	  understand	  of	  identity	  is	  connected	  to	  language	  and	  
the	  meanings	  we	  attach	  to	  it.	  Consequently,	  both	  Garfinkel	  (1967)	  and	  Butler’s	  (1990,	  2004)	  
theories	  show	  that	  even	  though	  we	  may	  experience	  gender	  that	  is	  not	  represented	  as	  within	  
the	  ‘normal’	  range,	  we	  tend	  to	  fit	  ourselves	  into	  normative	  gender	  categories.	  
	  
Doing	  Gender,	  or	  Gender	  as	  ‘Performativity’	  
West	  and	  Zimmerman’s	  (1987)	  view	  of	  doing	  gender	  supposes	  that	  how	  people	  manage	  social	  
situations	  makes	  their	  behaviour	  and	  presentation	  of	  gender	  ‘appropriate’	  or	  ‘inappropriate’.	  
Their	  theory	  emphasises	  how	  women	  and	  men	  in	  organisations	  ‘do’	  gender	  appropriately	  by	  
constructing,	  expressing	  and	  maintaining	  binary	  gender	  roles	  and	  identities	  during	  ordinary	  
social	  practices	  (West	  &	  Zimmerman,	  1987).	  If	  we	  do	  not	  succeed	  in	  ‘doing’	  gender	  
‘appropriately’,	  we	  as	  individuals	  are	  called	  into	  account	  for	  our	  intentions	  or	  motive	  (West	  &	  
Zimmerman,	  1987).	  While	  West	  and	  Zimmerman	  (1987)	  reveal	  how	  social	  pressures	  require	  
people	  to	  manage	  their	  gender	  representations,	  their	  theory	  also	  obscures	  individual	  
experiences	  of	  gender	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  macro	  perspective	  of	  how	  gender	  is	  negotiated	  
through	  roles	  within	  the	  workplace.	  
	  
Judith	  Butler	  is	  a	  postmodernist	  who	  conceptualises	  gender	  primarily	  through	  her	  theory	  of	  
‘performativity’.	  Butler’s	  (1990)	  theory	  of	  gender	  performativity	  and	  construction	  of	  sexuality	  
highlights	  her	  view	  that	  ‘There	  is	  no	  gender	  identity	  behind	  the	  expressions	  of	  gender’	  (p.	  33).	  
Butler’s	  theory	  moves	  beyond	  a	  binary	  framework	  by	  describing	  categories	  of	  sex,	  and	  gender,	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as	  specific	  power	  structures.	  According	  to	  Butler,	  ‘identity	  is	  performatively	  constituted	  by	  the	  
very	  “expressions”	  that	  are	  said	  to	  be	  its	  results’	  (1990,	  p.	  33).	  Butler	  criticises	  gender	  
performativity	  as	  complicit	  in	  the	  strengthening	  of	  normative	  expectations	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  
be	  male	  or	  female	  (1990).	  She	  argues	  that	  such	  ‘acts’	  lead	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  people	  incapable	  
of	  imitating	  norms	  that	  correspond	  to	  their	  anatomical	  sex	  (Butler,	  1990,	  p.	  33).	  	  
	  
Butler	  (1990)	  positions	  herself	  against	  biological	  theories	  of	  gender,	  arguing	  that	  historical	  
discourse	  inscribes	  ‘sex’	  on	  the	  body	  at	  birth,	  while	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  are	  performed	  
through	  ‘doing’.	  Butler	  intentionally	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘natural’	  in	  conjunction	  with	  performance	  to	  
trouble	  essentialist	  explanations	  of	  sex	  that	  privilege	  a	  structure	  of	  dominance.	  She	  explains:	  
‘Gender	  is	  the	  repeated	  stylization	  of	  the	  body,	  a	  set	  of	  repeated	  acts	  within	  a	  highly	  rigid	  
regulatory	  frame	  that	  congeal	  over	  time	  to	  produce	  the	  appearance	  of	  substance,	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  
being’	  (Butler,	  1990,	  p.	  25).	  She	  also	  suggests	  that	  individuals	  are	  ambivalent	  about	  gender	  
diversity,	  acting	  as	  if	  natural	  definitions	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  apply	  (Butler,	  1990).	  Performance,	  
gender	  identity	  and	  sexual	  power	  are	  inextricably	  linked,	  and	  thus	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  
identity	  is	  tied	  in	  with	  notions	  of	  rationality,	  discourse	  and	  power	  (Butler,	  1990).	  	  
	  
Butler’s	  (1990)	  theory	  of	  ‘performativity’	  illuminates	  that	  certain	  gendered	  behaviours	  are	  not	  
based	  on	  nature	  but,	  alternatively,	  illustrate	  the	  ways	  that	  individuals	  learn	  the	  performance	  of	  
gendered	  behaviour	  (in	  particular,	  understandings	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity).	  Butler’s	  
(2004)	  work	  takes	  on	  the	  performativity	  of	  gender	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  deconstructing	  
repetitive	  acts	  of	  gender	  through	  the	  subversion	  of	  undoing,	  or	  unperforming,	  hegemonic	  
modes	  of	  gender.	  She	  argues	  that	  political	  subversion	  of	  gender	  performances	  is	  necessary.	  In	  
her	  examination	  of	  gender,	  Butler	  essentially	  argues	  that	  gender	  is	  not	  a	  certainty	  of	  nature	  
but	  rather	  a	  social	  concept	  that	  we	  ‘do’	  or	  ‘perform’	  (Butler,	  2004).	  Butler’s	  (1990)	  view	  
presupposes	  a	  heterosexual	  bias	  obscuring	  the	  way	  gender	  is	  revised	  in	  queer	  contexts.	  Butler	  
(1990)	  argues	  that	  queer	  gender	  performance	  can	  subvert	  such	  norms	  by	  exposing	  their	  non-­‐
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natural,	  imitative	  character.	  But	  by	  portraying	  queer	  performances	  in	  this	  way,	  Butler	  (1990)	  
relies	  on	  a	  premise	  of	  heterosexuality	  bias.	  Butler’s	  (1990,	  2004)	  accounts	  of	  performances	  as	  
‘troubling’	  heterosexism	  by	  placing	  themselves	  as	  oppositional	  are	  problematic	  for	  
transgender	  identity	  because	  they	  categorise	  lived	  gender	  experiences	  as	  merely	  
performances	  of	  an	  institutional	  norm	  rather	  than	  as	  genuine	  lived	  experiences	  of	  gender.	  
Although	  Butler	  (1990,	  2004)	  illuminates	  that	  gender	  is	  constrained	  by	  binary	  assumptions,	  
her	  theory	  also	  positions	  binary	  gender	  in	  a	  dominant	  position,	  reinforcing	  the	  assumption	  
that	  binary	  gender	  is	  the	  dominant	  experience	  of	  gender.	  
	  
The	  ‘Other’	  Gender	  
In	  her	  work	  The	  Second	  Sex	  (1949),	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir	  claims,	  ‘One	  is	  not	  born,	  but	  rather	  
becomes	  a	  woman’.	  This	  claim	  is	  de	  Beauvoir’s	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  establishing	  
acts	  from	  the	  phenomenological	  tradition.	  She	  does	  not	  see	  gender	  as	  a	  stable	  identity,	  but	  
rather	  describes	  the	  female	  gender	  identity	  as	  a	  category	  of	  other,	  drawing	  on	  the	  concept	  that	  
every	  group	  that	  sets	  itself	  up	  as	  one	  is	  set	  against	  the	  other	  (de	  Beauvoir,	  1949).	  De	  Beauvoir	  
advocates	  that	  humanity	  is	  male	  and	  that	  man	  defines	  woman	  not	  in	  herself	  but	  as	  relative	  to	  
him	  —	  she	  is	  not	  autonomous	  (1949).	  De	  Beauvoir	  argues	  that	  women	  require	  a	  concrete	  
means	  of	  organising	  themselves	  into	  a	  unit	  (1949).	  Women	  are	  situated	  as	  dependent	  on	  
males,	  and	  they	  are	  partially	  constrained	  by	  customs,	  including	  land	  and	  property	  inequality	  
(de	  Beauvoir,	  1949).	  De	  Beauvoir’s	  primary	  thesis	  is	  that	  men	  fundamentally	  oppress	  women	  
by	  characterising	  them,	  on	  every	  level,	  as	  the	  ‘Other’,	  defined	  exclusively	  in	  opposition	  to	  men	  
(1949).	  
	  
Gender	  as	  a	  Reflection	  of	  the	  Materiality	  of	  the	  Modern	  World:	  The	  Production	  
and	  Reproduction	  of	  ‘Norms’	  
Materialist	  theorists	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  social	  world,	  suggesting	  that	  gender	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  
materiality	  of	  the	  contemporary	  world	  (Haraway,	  1989,	  1991;	  Overall,	  2009;	  Stryker,	  2004,	  
2006,	  2008).	  This	  theory	  illuminates	  the	  material	  foundations	  of	  gender	  and	  sees	  gender	  as	  a	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reflection	  of	  a	  material	  life	  (Haraway,	  1989,	  1991;	  Overall,	  2009;	  Stryker,	  2004,	  2006,	  2008).	  
The	  phrase	  ‘material	  life’	  describes	  our	  contemporary	  world	  where	  knowledge	  is	  legitimised	  
by	  performance	  criteria	  (Stryker,	  2008).	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  definitions	  of	  gender	  are	  generated	  
and	  supported	  by	  institutional	  discourse	  and	  practices	  and	  these	  create	  perceptions	  of	  what	  it	  
means	  to	  be	  a	  ‘normal’	  gender.	  As	  a	  result,	  ‘normal’	  becomes	  embedded	  into	  the	  very	  
foundation	  of	  life,	  influencing	  how	  individuals	  think,	  react	  and	  respond	  to	  everyday	  situations	  
(Franklin,	  2012).	  Stryker	  (2006)	  also	  advocates	  that	  transgender	  individuals	  subvert	  material	  
understandings	  of	  how	  gender	  is	  represented.	  She	  explains	  that	  ‘Transgender	  phenomena,	  in	  
short,	  points	  the	  way	  to	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  how	  bodies	  mean,	  how	  representation	  
works,	  and	  what	  counts	  as	  legitimate	  knowledge’	  (p.	  4).	  	  
	  
Dorothy	  Smith	  (1987)	  discusses	  gender	  from	  a	  feminist	  perspective.	  Her	  work	  describes	  the	  
relevance	  of	  class	  to	  gender	  and	  structures	  of	  authority.	  Smith’s	  interpretation	  of	  attributed	  
gender	  connects	  to	  an	  individual’s	  standpoint,	  and	  is	  known	  as	  the	  ‘standpoint’	  theory	  (1987).	  
‘Standpoint’	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  a	  person's	  response	  to	  the	  social	  world	  and	  the	  level	  of	  
their	  knowledge	  is	  affected	  by	  where	  they	  ‘stand’	  (Smith,	  1987).	  Smith	  explains	  that	  women	  
are	  always	  negotiating	  the	  materiality	  of	  life	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  their	  personal	  status,	  that	  
‘objective	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  relations	  …	  shape	  and	  determine	  women’s	  oppression’	  
(1987,	  p.	  12).	  Smith	  argues	  that	  hegemonic	  interpretations	  are	  dominant	  and	  alter	  the	  world’s	  
perspective	  of	  normality	  (Smith,	  1987).	  As	  a	  result,	  she	  suggests,	  gender	  is	  placed	  under	  rigidly	  
authorised	  lenses	  where	  individuals	  are	  constrained	  by	  gender	  stereotyping	  and	  are	  required	  
to	  accept	  their	  societal	  position	  (Smith,	  1987).	  	  
	  
Haraway	  is	  another	  feminist	  who	  discusses	  and	  critiques	  ‘standpoint	  feminism’.	  Haraway	  
(1989,	  1991)	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘situated	  knowledges’,	  which	  go	  beyond	  ‘standpoint’	  to	  
stress	  partial	  identities	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  diversion	  as	  a	  way	  to	  break	  the	  deadlock	  in	  feminist	  
thought	  between	  standpoint	  theory	  and	  constructivist	  feminism.	  She	  suggests	  that	  through	  a	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partial	  viewpoint,	  we	  can	  be	  mindful	  of	  current	  epistemological	  narratives	  and	  a	  relationship	  
between	  subject	  and	  object	  that	  isn’t	  static	  and	  one-­‐way.	  She	  highlights	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
consider	  various	  truths	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  avoiding	  one	  ultimate	  ‘truth’	  (Haraway,	  1991).	  
Haraway	  argues	  that	  feminist	  objectivity	  is	  not	  achieved	  solely	  through	  ‘women’s	  experience’	  
as	  a	  singular	  analytical	  location	  (1991).	  Haraway	  argues	  that	  ‘an	  epistemology	  of	  location,	  
positioning	  and	  situating’	  (1991,	  p.	  186)	  is	  significant	  to	  gender	  analysis.	  This	  is	  relevant	  to	  a	  
discussion	  of	  gender	  because	  it	  illuminates	  that	  although	  women	  may	  have	  many	  shared	  
experiences	  of	  gender,	  feminism	  —	  like	  all	  theoretical	  positions	  —	  must	  be	  reflective	  and	  
inclusive	  of	  other	  social	  players,	  considering	  how	  gender	  is	  experienced	  across	  a	  population	  
(Haraway,	  1991,	  p.	  186).	  
	  
Christine	  Overall	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  contemporary	  world	  is	  reflected	  
through	  medical	  and	  scientific	  labels	  that	  create	  artificial	  realities,	  causing	  serious	  harm	  to	  
transgender	  individuals.	  She	  claims	  that	  a	  cis	  gender	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘social	  normal’,	  while	  
transgender	  is	  perceived	  as	  socially	  deviant	  (Overall,	  2009,	  p.	  252).	  Overall	  (2009)	  also	  argues	  
that	  gender	  formation	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  two	  separate	  concepts	  of	  acquired	  and	  aspirational	  
identities.	  The	  social	  categories	  of	  boy/man	  and	  girl/woman	  are	  ideological	  concepts	  that	  each	  
of	  us	  aspires	  to	  present	  and	  maintain.	  The	  first	  part	  is	  assigned,	  for	  example	  ‘boy’,	  then	  the	  
second	  part,	  of	  becoming	  a	  ‘man’,	  is	  earned	  through	  work	  and	  maintenance	  (Overall,	  2009).	  
Butler	  (1990)	  also	  critiques	  the	  production	  of	  gender	  norms,	  considering	  them	  a	  materially	  
based	  understanding	  of	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  survival	  and	  social	  transformation.	  
Her	  theory	  takes	  the	  concept	  of	  materiality	  further,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  ‘regulatory	  norms	  of	  
“sex”	  work	  are	  “performative”’,	  constituting	  the	  materiality	  of	  bodies.	  She	  further	  suggests	  that	  
‘sex’	  work	  specifically	  materialises	  ‘the	  body’s	  sex,	  to	  materialize	  sexual	  difference	  in	  the	  
service	  of	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  heterosexual	  imperative’	  (Butler,	  1990,	  p.	  2).	  	  
	  
	   38	  
Stryker’s	  (2004)	  work	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  by	  shaping	  two	  threads	  of	  meaning	  
associated	  with	  ‘transgender’	  and	  how	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  human	  body	  and	  mind	  encompass	  
personhood.	  Through	  a	  discussion	  of	  transgender	  paradigm,	  Stryker	  describes	  the	  social	  
constraints	  of	  gender	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  material	  life	  and	  the	  oppressions	  that	  reflect	  the	  
materiality	  of	  our	  bodies	  (2004).	  Stryker	  (2004)	  discusses	  ‘transgender’	  as	  a	  more	  diverse	  and	  
encompassing	  term	  ‘that	  refers	  to	  all	  identities	  or	  practices	  that	  cross	  over,	  cut	  across,	  move	  
between	  or	  otherwise	  queer	  socially	  constructed	  sex/gender	  boundaries’	  (p.	  215).	  Stryker	  
contributes	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  by	  illuminating	  that	  aspects	  of	  identity	  politics	  often	  cut	  
people	  off	  from	  one	  another	  (Stryker,	  2004,	  2008).	  
	  
Degendering	  
Judith	  Lorber	  (1993,	  1994)	  challenges	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  gender	  difference,	  advocating	  
for	  the	  degendering	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  In	  ‘“Night	  to	  his	  Day”:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  
Gender’,	  Lorber	  (1994)	  identifies	  two	  aspects	  of	  gender:	  first,	  the	  gender	  process	  (socially	  
different	  expectations	  for	  ‘woman’	  and	  ‘man’)	  and,	  second,	  the	  stratification	  system	  (gender	  
ranks	  determining	  which	  group	  is	  superior	  to	  the	  other).	  Lorber	  argues	  that	  because	  gender	  is	  
identified	  at	  birth,	  an	  individual	  cannot	  avoid	  the	  construct	  of	  their	  given	  gender,	  whether	  or	  
not	  they	  identify	  or	  express	  themselves	  by	  it	  (1994).	  She	  describes	  gender	  identity	  as	  
constrained	  further	  by	  the	  authority	  of	  norms	  that	  coerce	  our	  ability	  to	  challenge	  our	  birth	  sex	  
and	  corresponding	  gender	  alignment	  (Lober,	  1994).	  	  
	  
Lorber	  (1993)	  argues	  that	  ‘bodies	  differ	  in	  many	  ways	  physiologically;	  but	  they	  are	  completely	  
transformed	  by	  social	  practices	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  salient	  categories	  of	  society,	  the	  most	  pervasive	  
of	  which	  are	  “female”	  and	  “male”	  and	  “women”	  and	  “men”’	  (p.	  12).	  Lorber	  takes	  the	  position	  
that	  bodies	  do	  not	  all	  biologically	  fit	  within	  the	  binary,	  and	  she	  further	  argues	  that	  ‘neither	  sex	  
or	  gender	  are	  pure	  categories’	  (1993).	  Lorber	  challenges	  the	  binary	  and	  biological	  
understandings	  of	  gender	  when	  she	  confirms	  that	  ‘gendered	  people	  do	  not	  emerge	  from	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physiology	  or	  hormones,	  but	  from	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  social	  order’	  (1993).	  She	  suggests	  that	  
categories	  could	  be	  produced	  to	  fit	  a	  variety	  of	  sexed	  bodies,	  but	  she	  believes	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  
socially	  constructed	  gendered	  meanings	  would	  continue	  pre-­‐determined	  special	  classifications	  
(Lorber,	  1993).	  Lorber	  questions	  how	  the	  social	  classification	  of	  gender	  can	  be	  modified,	  if	  it	  
can	  at	  all,	  and	  thus	  calls	  for	  the	  degendering	  of	  the	  social	  world	  (1993).	  	  
	  
Structures	  of	  Power:	  	  Hegemonic	  Masculinity	  and	  Patriarchal	  Culture 	  	  
Patriarchy	  is	  the	  process	  in	  which	  men	  oppress	  and	  exploit	  women	  (Robinson,	  2003),	  but	  
patriarchy	  is	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  gender	  beyond	  the	  context	  of	  only	  women	  (Connell,	  1992,	  
2005;	  Kimmel,	  1994).	  There	  are	  six	  structures	  of	  patriarchy:	  patriarchal	  mode	  of	  production,	  
patriarchal	  relations	  in	  paid	  work,	  patriarchal	  state,	  male	  violence,	  patriarchal	  relations	  in	  
sexuality,	  and	  patriarchal	  culture	  (Walby,	  1990).	  Connell	  (1992,	  2005)	  and	  Kimmel	  (1994)	  
analyse	  socially	  constructed	  foundations	  of	  gender,	  looking	  at	  how	  patriarchal	  structures	  
reinforce	  and	  maintain	  gendered	  perception.	  They	  define	  the	  ways	  cultural	  recognitions	  of	  
gender	  contribute	  to	  roles	  and	  social	  relations	  between	  individuals,	  groups	  and	  male-­‐
dominated	  structures	  of	  society.	  They	  suggest	  that	  experiences	  for	  both	  males	  and	  females	  are	  
reinforced	  and	  subsequently	  embodied	  through	  cultural	  repetition	  of	  constructs	  that	  are	  
normative	  for	  that	  culture	  (Franklin,	  2012).	  Societal	  systems	  contribute	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  
distinct	  gender	  performance	  and	  the	  shaping	  of	  an	  individual’s	  sexuality.	  Consequently,	  within	  
both	  public	  and	  private	  spheres,	  there	  are	  pluralities,	  ambiguous	  identities	  and	  gender	  and	  
sexual	  performances	  that	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  norms.	  
	  
Connell	  (1992,	  2005)	  discusses	  gender	  through	  the	  discourse	  of	  masculine	  configurations	  of	  
gender	  practice.	  She	  argues	  that	  men	  collectively	  control	  institutions,	  creating	  powerful	  
institutions	  of	  coercion	  that	  she	  calls	  ‘competing	  masculinities’.	  She	  suggests	  that	  under	  a	  
patriarchal	  system,	  males,	  the	  masculine	  gender	  grouping,	  dominate	  with	  their	  stronger	  
bodies	  and	  dominance-­‐driven	  behaviour,	  presenting	  a	  clear	  simplification	  of	  masculinity	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(Connell,	  1992.).	  However,	  the	  reality	  may	  be	  that	  most	  males	  do	  not	  fit	  neatly	  inside	  the	  
gender	  assignment	  they	  have	  bestowed	  upon	  them	  through	  the	  binary	  any	  more	  than	  other	  
individuals	  who	  experience	  transgressions	  of	  binary	  gender	  (Connell,	  1992).	  Connell	  justifies	  
her	  argument	  thus:	  ‘Conventional	  masculinity	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  object	  of	  desire,	  yet	  it	  is	  
subverted	  by	  this	  object	  choice;	  a	  contradictory	  masculinity	  is	  produced’	  (1992,	  p.	  735).	  
	  
Connell	  (2005)	  illuminates	  that	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  identity	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  beyond	  the	  
basic	  categorisation	  of	  relationships	  between	  women	  and	  men.	  Gender	  identity	  is	  a	  construct	  
that	  alters	  all	  experience	  of	  behaviours,	  attitudes	  and	  differences	  that	  divide	  people	  based	  on	  
the	  concepts	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine.	  Connell	  illuminates	  this	  to	  some	  degree,	  suggesting	  
‘moving	  toward	  a	  gender-­‐equal	  society	  requires	  widespread	  social	  support,	  including	  
significant	  support	  from	  men	  and	  boys’	  (2005,	  p.	  1801).	  	  
	  
Kimmel	  (1994)	  also	  views	  ‘masculinity	  as	  a	  constantly	  changing	  collection	  of	  meanings	  that	  we	  
construct	  through	  our	  relationships	  with	  ourselves,	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  with	  our	  world’	  
(Kimmel,	  1994,	  p.	  119).	  Kimmel	  argues	  that	  identifying	  	  ‘Manhood’	  as	  not	  connected	  to	  any	  
form	  of	  ‘biological	  makeup’	  is	  liberating	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  flexible	  and	  fluid	  agency	  
of	  gender	  identity	  (1994,	  p.	  119).	  	  	  
	  
Transgender	  Understandings	  of	  Gender	  	  
Leslie	  Feinberg	  (1996)	  shows	  that	  transgender	  people	  are	  problematically	  situated	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  binary	  categories	  of	  man	  and	  woman.	  Feinberg’s	  writing	  illuminates	  three	  major	  
features	  of	  the	  transgender	  paradigm.	  The	  first	  is	  recognition	  of	  gender-­‐based	  oppression,	  
usually	  targeting	  transgender	  people,	  as	  distinct	  from	  and	  non-­‐reducible	  to	  sexist	  oppression.	  
Second	  is	  the	  positioning	  of	  transgender	  people	  as	  problematically	  situated	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
binary	  categories	  man	  and	  woman,	  and	  third	  is	  the	  endorsement	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  visibility	  
(Feinberg,	  1996).	  Within	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  features,	  Feinberg	  illuminates	  that	  normative	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understandings	  of	  gender	  categories	  are	  naturally	  situated	  in	  a	  binary	  (1996).	  Moreover,	  
gender	  described	  as	  a	  binary	  does	  not	  fairly	  reflect	  gender	  as	  experienced	  by	  a	  transgender	  
person	  or	  those	  who	  experience	  non-­‐normative	  gender	  (Feinberg,	  1996).	  
Categorisations	  place	  individuals	  into	  gender	  roles	  (Whittle,	  2006).	  Whittle	  writes	  that	  ‘a	  trans	  
identity	  is	  now	  accessible	  almost	  anywhere,	  to	  anyone	  who	  does	  not	  feel	  comfortable	  in	  the	  
gender	  role	  they	  were	  attributed	  with	  at	  birth,	  or	  who	  has	  a	  gender	  identity	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  
labels	  “man”	  or	  “woman”	  credited	  to	  them	  by	  formal	  authorities’	  (Whittle,	  2006,	  Forward,	  p.	  
xi).	  Whittle’s	  (2006)argument	  supports	  other	  theorists	  who	  claim	  that	  modern	  gender	  is	  a	  
social	  construct	  that	  creates	  distinctions	  that	  polarise	  relations	  between	  individuals	  based	  on	  
singular	  and	  unitary	  conceptions	  of	  gender	  identity	  (Lorber,	  1993,	  1994;	  Connell,	  1992,	  2005;	  
Kimmel,	  1994).	  Whittle	  also	  describes	  that	  ‘a	  trans	  person	  might	  be	  a	  butch	  or	  a	  camp,	  a	  
transgender	  or	  a	  transsexual,	  an	  MTF	  or	  FTM	  or	  a	  cross-­‐dresser;	  they	  might,	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  
the	  world,	  consider	  themselves	  a	  lady	  boy,	  katoey,	  or	  even	  the	  reclaimed	  Maori	  identities	  
whakawahine	  or	  whakatane’	  (2006,	  p.	  xi),	  illuminating	  the	  broadness	  of	  current	  gender	  
realities	  that	  are	  constrained	  within	  the	  oppositional	  binary	  model.	  
	  
Both	  Feinberg	  (1996)	  and	  Whittle	  (2006)	  provide	  explanations	  that	  draw	  attention	  to	  
normative	  assumptions	  of	  gender	  that	  restrict	  the	  expression	  and	  legitimate	  status	  of	  many	  
individuals	  who	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  ‘other’.	  Stryker	  (2006)	  also	  highlights	  that	  transgender	  
individuals	  complicate	  normalised	  understandings	  of	  ‘the	  social	  roles	  and	  statuses	  that	  a	  
particular	  form	  of	  body	  is	  expected	  to	  occupy,	  the	  subjectively	  experienced	  relationship	  
between	  a	  gendered	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  social	  expectations	  of	  gender-­‐role	  performance,	  and	  the	  
cultural	  mechanisms	  that	  work	  to	  sustain	  …	  configurations	  of	  gendered	  personhood’	  (p.	  3).	  	  
	  
Stone	  (1991)	  is	  a	  post-­‐operative	  M	  to	  F	  transgender	  individual	  who	  has	  adopted	  a	  postmodern	  
position	  that	  seeks	  to	  understand	  transgression	  between	  biologically	  understood	  gender	  and	  
lived	  gender	  realities.	  Stone	  points	  out	  that	  success	  for	  a	  transsexual	  is	  to	  have	  ‘passed’,	  to	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have	  been	  ‘read’	  as	  a	  natural	  member	  of	  the	  adopted	  sex	  (1991).	  In	  addition	  to	  ‘passing’	  by	  
appearing	  and	  sounding	  convincingly	  female	  (or	  male),	  another	  key	  factor	  in	  successfully	  
consolidating	  the	  transsexual’s	  new	  identity	  is	  the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  total	  life	  
story	  ‘suitable’	  to	  the	  newly	  acquired	  sex,	  in	  which	  all	  references	  to	  the	  transsexual’s	  pre-­‐
operative	  life	  are	  either	  erased	  or	  altered.	  In	  doing	  this,	  Stone	  raises	  questions	  about	  what	  is	  
classed	  socially	  as	  ‘natural’	  (especially	  about	  women),	  forming	  an	  argument	  that	  clearly	  
identifies	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  binary	  gender	  and	  lived	  gender	  experiences	  (1991).	  
	  
Critiques	  of	  Social	  Constructionist	  and	  Postmodernist	  Theories	  of	  Gender	  
The	  social	  constructionist	  approach	  is	  that	  these	  theories	  predominantly	  arise	  out	  of	  methods	  
that	  fully	  dispute	  the	  relevance	  of	  biological	  or	  environmental	  mediators.	  Thus,	  critiques	  of	  
social	  construction	  mostly	  comment	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  social	  theory	  excludes	  relevant	  
biological	  information	  (Götschel,	  2011).	  For	  example,	  Butler's	  (1990,	  2004)	  primary	  
arguments	  are	  opposed	  to	  scientific	  research,	  situating	  her	  work	  as	  purely	  theoretical	  rather	  
than	  foundational.	  	  
	  
Another	  issue	  that	  arises	  in	  discussion	  of	  a	  postmodern	  approach	  to	  gender	  is	  that	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  fully	  separate	  any	  individual	  from	  their	  physical	  and	  social	  environment,	  
meaning	  that	  biosocial	  mediating	  factors	  are	  likely	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  mediating	  
gender	  representations.	  And	  yet	  the	  postmodern	  approach	  describes	  patterns	  and	  repetitions	  
as	  if	  they	  exist	  and	  are	  reproduced	  outside	  environmental	  factors	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2003).	  	  
	  
The	  common	  thread	  running	  through	  poststructuralism	  is	  that	  the	  study	  of	  repeated	  patterns	  
of	  daily	  life	  can	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  relations	  between	  each	  element	  (their	  order	  and	  
place)	  (Butler,	  1990;	  West	  and	  Zimmerman,	  1987).	  Because	  poststructuralist	  writings	  cannot	  
be	  abstract	  theoretical	  reflections,	  they	  must	  take	  an	  actual	  structure	  and	  deconstruct	  it,	  
transform	  it,	  show	  its	  exclusions.	  In	  so	  doing,	  looking	  at	  gender	  from	  a	  poststructuralist	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feminist	  perspective	  can	  lead	  to	  assumptions	  about	  gender	  and	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  all	  gender	  
(Salih,	  2002).	  Gavey	  (2005)	  also	  highlights	  the	  postmodernist	  approach,	  suggesting	  that	  
postmodernist	  discourse	  maintains	  understandings	  that	  are	  inconsistent	  or	  may	  contradict	  
some	  gender	  experiences.	  Because	  the	  individual	  experiences	  their	  gender	  as	  lived,	  ‘the	  
patterns	  and	  practices	  discussed’	  in	  postmodernist	  gender	  ‘may	  become	  almost	  invisible’	  
(Gavey,	  2005,	  p.	  93).	  Thus	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  gendered	  as	  described	  through	  patterns	  
and	  repetition	  is	  not	  easily	  subverted	  in	  any	  real	  non-­‐binary	  way.	  It	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  dynamic	  
acceptance	  of	  gender	  diverse	  representations	  would	  allow	  for	  greater	  variations	  and	  
exploration	  of	  gender.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Because	  gender	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  our	  social	  identity,	  social	  meanings	  attributed	  to	  
gendered	  behaviour	  have	  a	  social	  significance	  that	  impacts	  upon	  individuals’	  lived	  
experiences.	  Deep	  assumptions	  govern	  how	  we	  see	  the	  self,	  and	  many	  of	  those	  assumptions	  
are	  directly	  linked	  to	  gender.	  Conceptualising	  gender	  from	  a	  social	  point	  of	  view	  primarily	  
illuminates	  how	  cultural	  constructs	  are	  mediated	  in	  very	  different	  ways,	  all	  producing	  
varieties	  of	  gender	  representation	  (Butler,	  1990;	  Chodorow,	  1978;	  Feinberg,	  1996).	  Different	  
theories	  highlight	  different	  aspects	  of	  how	  gender	  integrates	  into	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  what	  it	  is	  
to	  be	  social.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  gender	  is	  intrinsically	  associated	  with	  social	  and	  cultural	  
systems	  that	  define	  and	  create	  perceptions	  of	  our	  reality	  in	  everyday	  life.	  
	   	  
	   44	  




The	  ‘biosocial’6	  model	  —	  sometimes	  described	  as	  ‘nature	  and	  nurture’	  —	  identifies	  how	  
biological	  and	  environmental	  aspects	  interact	  to	  produce	  gender	  characteristics.	  This	  
approach	  challenges	  those	  who	  describe	  gender	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  ‘nature’	  or	  ‘nurture’	  
or	  ‘nature	  versus	  nurture’,	  claiming	  that	  they	  underestimate	  the	  interactive	  complexity	  of	  
biology	  and	  the	  environment	  (Ridley,	  2003).	  The	  biosocial	  approach	  proposes	  a	  divergence	  
from	  evolutionary	  psychology	  theories,	  which	  attribute	  sex-­‐related	  differences	  to	  the	  
activation	  of	  predetermined	  behavioural	  selections	  (Buss	  &	  Schmitt,	  2011).	  	  
	  
As	  an	  alternative	  to	  essentialism,	  biosocial	  theorists	  conceptualise	  that	  humans	  are	  not	  
separate	  from	  their	  environment	  and,	  therefore,	  can	  only	  be	  discussed	  within	  this	  relationship.	  
Philosopher	  Mese	  van	  den	  Berg	  (2011)	  reinforces	  this	  concept,	  explaining	  that	  ‘social	  
constructivism,	  like	  biological	  determinism,	  presumes	  a	  “split”	  world,	  where	  subjective	  lived	  
experiences	  are	  separated	  from	  the	  world	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  forces’	  (p.	  i).	  Theorists	  using	  this	  
approach	  argue	  that	  biological	  theory	  complements	  objective	  theories	  of	  gender	  because	  of	  its	  
connection	  with	  genes	  and	  the	  environment	  (McLeod,	  2014).	  	  
	  
The	  ‘Biosocial’	  Construction	  Model	  
The	  biosocial	  construction	  model,	  as	  theorised	  by	  Eagly	  and	  Wood	  (2012,	  2013),	  is	  divided	  
into	  two	  concepts	  of	  biology	  and	  social	  agreements	  interacting	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  social	  
aspect	  of	  this	  theory	  explains	  the	  internalising	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  beliefs	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  
2012).	  They	  contend	  that	  culture-­‐based	  gender	  roles	  influence	  an	  individual’s	  gender	  
formation	  by	  strengthening	  shared	  beliefs	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  the	  individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Referring to a combination of biology (bio) and social roles, construction and other environmental factors of 
the social world (social).	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confirms	  others’	  gender	  expectations	  by	  internalising	  them	  as	  personal	  standards	  for	  
gendered	  behaviour	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  2012,	  2013).	  The	  biological	  aspect	  of	  this	  theory	  explains	  
the	  processes	  such	  as	  hormonal	  activation	  that	  influence	  and	  support	  gender	  role	  
characteristics.	  Through	  the	  joining	  of	  biosocial	  processes,	  individuals	  within	  a	  society	  are	  
described	  as	  dynamically	  constructing	  gender	  in	  patterns	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  their	  generation,	  
culture	  and	  environmental	  situation	  (Eagly	  &	  Wood,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Nature	  	  
Nature	  is	  the	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  biological	  characteristics	  that	  a	  human	  body	  can	  
experience	  throughout	  the	  lifespan.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  the	  natural,	  historical	  exaggeration	  
of	  gender	  differences,	  theorists	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000b,	  2003;	  Richardson,	  2014;	  Griffiths,	  
Miller,	  Suzuki,	  Lewontin,	  &	  Gelbart,	  2000)	  look	  at	  the	  interaction	  from	  the	  epistemological	  
point	  of	  view	  that	  nature	  is	  not	  deterministic,	  or	  designed	  to	  produce	  a	  dominant	  species.	  
Instead,	  they	  search	  for	  clues	  to	  how	  interactions	  produce	  gender	  within	  and	  through	  the	  
biological	  body	  (Weiss,	  Bates,	  &	  Luciano,	  2008).	  
	  
Researchers	  look	  at	  the	  ways	  individuals	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  influencing	  factors,	  
identifying	  how	  they	  may	  affect	  genetics,	  hormones	  and	  other	  physical	  and	  psychological	  
aspects	  (brain	  functions	  and	  mechanisms)	  connected	  to	  the	  biological	  body	  (Richardson,	  
2014).	  Predominantly,	  these	  studies	  are	  conducted	  at	  a	  genetic	  and	  molecular	  level	  and	  factor	  
into	  their	  interpretations	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  conditions	  of	  the	  individual/s	  who	  are	  
undergoing	  evaluation	  (Ricahrdson,	  2014;	  Griffiths,	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  	  
	  
Nurture	  
Nurture	  is	  the	  umbrella	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  environmental	  conditions,	  culture,	  social	  roles	  
and	  social	  agreements	  thought	  to	  influence	  gender	  development	  and	  gendered	  phenomena	  
(Fine,	  2010;	  Lippa,	  2010).	  Nurture	  is	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  child’s	  upbringing	  and	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social	  environment	  influence	  their	  developing	  gender	  identity	  behaviour	  and	  their	  gender-­‐
linked	  characteristics	  (Franklin,	  2012).	  The	  environment	  may	  be	  the	  most	  influential	  mediator	  
of	  sex-­‐related	  differences	  (Chung	  &	  Auger,	  2013).	  It	  shapes	  behaviour.	  For	  example,	  males	  are	  
socially	  expected	  to	  exhibit	  greater	  independence	  than	  females,	  and	  thus	  they	  are	  encouraged	  
to	  engage	  in	  activities	  like	  exploring	  and	  manipulating	  the	  environment	  —	  activities	  that	  
improve	  spatial	  skills	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999;	  Caplan	  &	  Caplan,	  1997).	  	  
	  
Environments	  that	  alter	  gender	  formation	  are	  embedded	  in	  everyday	  life	  (Ridley,	  2003).	  For	  
example,	  culture	  and	  literacy	  are	  described	  as	  two	  environmental	  factors	  that	  alter	  brain	  
growth	  and	  cognitive	  functions	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  Other	  aspects	  described	  as	  primary	  
mediators	  are	  family	  influence,	  economic	  status,	  cultural	  inclusion	  or	  exclusion,	  inherited	  
conditions	  and	  traits,	  access	  to	  resources	  including	  education,	  health	  conditions	  and	  status	  
(Fine,	  2010).	  Other	  factors	  are	  more	  variable	  throughout	  development,	  for	  example,	  stress,	  
happiness,	  dietary	  factors,	  hobbies,	  activities,	  interests,	  exposure	  to	  particular	  cultural	  aspects,	  
preferences	  and	  overall	  self-­‐concept	  (Mitchell,	  Baker,	  &	  Jacklin,	  1989).	  
	  
Nurture	  as	  a	  concept	  explains	  how	  social	  customs,	  phenomena	  and	  events	  produce	  
physiological	  reactions	  and	  mutations	  in	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  body	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000b,	  
2003).	  Nurture	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  meanings	  and	  knowledge	  that	  create	  a	  perspective	  of	  gender	  
reality,	  including	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  social	  roles	  and	  the	  binary	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  
(Franklin,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  societal	  assumptions	  support	  the	  view	  that	  women	  are	  innately	  
less	  able	  than	  men.	  Another	  example	  is	  that	  gender	  biases	  can	  influence	  the	  relative	  resources	  
allocated	  within	  a	  society	  (Mitchell,	  Baker,	  &	  Jacklin,	  1989).	  
	  
Heritability:	  Genetics	  and	  Epigenetics	  
Theorists	  looking	  for	  biosocial	  interactions	  integrate	  heritability	  as	  one	  of	  the	  explanations	  
that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  biology	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  gender	  and	  the	  environment	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(Griffiths,	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  	  Heritability	  is	  described	  as	  a	  mediating	  aspect	  rather	  than	  a	  definitive	  
one	  because	  measures	  refer	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  variation	  between	  individuals	  in	  a	  population	  
(Griffiths,	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  It	  enables	  researchers	  to	  conduct	  larger	  scale	  group	  studies	  that	  
analyse	  the	  range	  of	  genetic	  influences	  on	  group	  variance,	  not	  individual	  causation	  (Griffiths,	  
et	  al.,	  2000).	  Gene-­‐mediated	  developmental	  processes	  remain	  at	  the	  fore,	  but	  variation	  from	  
individual	  to	  individual	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  consequence	  of	  genetic	  variation	  (Griffiths,	  et	  al.,	  
2000).	  Thus,	  heritability	  is	  only	  a	  partial	  explanation	  of	  the	  ways	  individuals	  or	  groups	  acquire	  
gender	  traits	  (Griffiths,	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  identify	  how	  the	  relevant	  determinants	  
operate	  alongside	  less	  permanent	  structures	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  For	  this	  reason,	  
larger	  scale	  research	  does	  not	  assess	  gender	  based	  on	  individual	  occurrences;	  instead,	  it	  
focuses	  on	  select	  differences,	  including	  several	  studies	  of	  children’s	  gender-­‐linked	  personality	  
characteristics,	  namely	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  (Mitchell,	  Baker,	  &	  Jacklin,	  1989).	  	  
	  
Genetics	  is	  the	  study	  of	  the	  heritable	  material	  present	  in	  the	  biological	  body.	  Epigenetics	  
describes	  how	  genes	  interact	  with	  another	  and	  with	  the	  environment	  at	  a	  molecular	  level	  and	  
provides	  the	  most	  conclusive	  explanations	  of	  biology’s	  connection	  to	  gender	  and	  the	  nurturing	  
process	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  Researchers	  looking	  at	  these	  sorts	  of	  genetic	  processes	  
search	  for	  indicators	  that	  express	  the	  operation	  of	  environmental	  pressures	  and	  how	  changes	  
occur	  that	  alter	  behaviour	  and	  genetic	  expression	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  An	  example	  
would	  be	  how	  environmental	  responses	  affect	  the	  expression	  of	  genes	  in	  areas	  like	  postnatal	  
variables	  or	  within	  medical	  interventions	  (Jordan-­‐Young,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Epigenetic	  changes	  in	  the	  nervous	  system	  identified	  as	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  persisting	  
effects	  induced	  by	  early	  life	  experience	  are	  hormonal	  exposure,	  trauma	  and	  injury,	  and	  
learning	  and	  memory	  (McCarthy	  et.	  al,	  2009).	  Researchers	  claim	  that	  sex-­‐linked	  differences	  in	  
the	  brain	  are	  frequently	  ‘determined	  by	  steroid	  hormone	  exposure	  during	  a	  perinatal	  sensitive	  
	   48	  
period	  that	  alters	  subsequent	  hormonal	  and	  non-­‐hormonal	  responses	  throughout	  the	  life	  span’	  
(McCarthy	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  p.	  1).	  	  
	  
Neurobiologists	  researching	  how	  genetic	  processes	  in	  the	  brain	  mediate	  sexual	  differentiation	  
in	  mammals	  have	  found	  gene	  expression	  profiles	  that	  have	  altered	  due	  to	  environmental	  
influences	  (Chung	  &	  Auger,	  2013).	  For	  example,	  Chung	  and	  Auger	  (2013)	  found	  that	  the	  brain	  
area	  known	  to	  govern	  male	  sexual	  behaviour	  was	  not	  closed	  after	  the	  first	  week	  of	  life	  as	  
previous	  studies	  had	  interpreted.	  Instead,	  interactions	  were	  still	  occurring	  that	  took	  on	  new	  
structural	  characteristics,	  illuminating	  that	  gender	  formation	  is	  ongoing	  and	  has	  limited	  
alignment	  with	  the	  sex	  chromosomes	  present	  in	  the	  unborn	  baby.	  Observations	  also	  suggest	  
that	  environmental	  interaction	  is	  substantial	  enough	  to	  alter	  biology	  even	  after	  birth,	  when	  the	  
human	  body	  is	  normally	  considered	  as	  already	  structurally	  resolved	  (Chung	  &	  Auger,	  2013).	  
Chung	  and	  Auger	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  we	  all	  have	  conditioned	  personality	  traits	  that	  are	  the	  
basis	  for	  how	  we	  would	  react	  to	  situations.	  
	  
Recent	  studies	  conducted	  by	  Weiss,	  Bates	  and	  Luciano	  (2008)	  examined	  whether	  personality	  
and	  subjective	  happiness	  share	  a	  common	  genetic	  structure.	  Using	  973	  twin	  pairs	  to	  test	  their	  
hypothesis	  that	  heritable	  differences	  in	  individual	  happiness	  are	  provided	  by	  the	  genetic	  
architecture	  of	  the	  Five-­‐Factor	  Model’s	  personality	  domains,	  they	  found	  that	  results	  supported	  
their	  model	  (Weiss,	  Bates,	  &	  Luciano,	  2008).	  They	  discovered	  that	  the	  subjective	  happiness	  
experienced	  contained	  unique	  genetic	  influences	  from	  neuroticism,	  extraversion	  and	  
conscientiousness	  (Weiss,	  Bates,	  &	  Luciano,	  2008).	  Their	  findings	  suggested	  that	  personality	  
traits	  result	  from	  interaction	  with	  environmental	  influences	  that	  can	  change	  over	  time	  (Weiss,	  
Bates,	  &	  Luciano,	  2008).	  This	  research	  is	  valuable	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  because	  it	  shows	  
that	  behavioural	  traits	  are	  not	  necessarily	  nature-­‐based,	  suggesting	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  
interaction	  with	  environmental	  factors	  (Fine,	  2010).	  	  
	   49	  
Genomics7	  and	  Postgenomics	  
Genomics	  is	  the	  study	  of	  the	  developmental	  context	  in	  which	  environmental	  exposures	  are	  
intensified,	  cues	  are	  transmitted	  and	  genes	  are	  programmed	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  
Genomics	  is	  often	  described	  as	  the	  relationship	  between	  personality	  and	  the	  individual,	  
looking	  at	  how	  emotion	  is	  influenced	  and	  mediated	  by	  genes	  (Weiss,	  Bates,	  &	  Luciano,	  2008).	  
With	  the	  advent	  of	  genomic	  sequencing,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  seek	  and	  identify	  specific	  gene	  
polymorphisms	  that	  alter	  human	  traits	  linked	  to	  gender	  variances	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  
2015).	  These	  techniques	  trace	  the	  association	  of	  differences	  in	  a	  trait	  of	  interest	  with	  
differences	  in	  specific	  molecular	  markers	  or	  functional	  variants	  (Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  	  
	  
Hormonal	  Interactions:	  Environmental	  	  
Current	  research	  into	  how	  human	  hormones	  interact	  with	  environmental	  features	  helps	  to	  
explain	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  diversity	  of	  gender	  forms.	  The	  examination	  of	  new	  gene	  
combinations	  shaping	  bodily	  structures,	  and	  biological	  potentialities,	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  
perspective	  of	  looking	  at	  hormones	  in	  the	  body	  and	  how	  these	  influence	  gender	  formation	  
(Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  Research	  claims	  that	  gonadal	  hormones	  alter	  the	  brain	  and	  
make	  male	  and	  female	  brains	  more	  or	  less	  responsive	  to	  different	  environments	  (Fine,	  2010;	  
Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  The	  hormones	  influence	  mechanisms	  by	  altering	  the	  susceptibility	  of	  
cortical	  neurons	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  environmental	  stimuli.	  Juraska	  (1986)	  found	  that	  exposure	  
to	  gonadal	  hormones	  prenatally	  (around	  birth)	  determines	  a	  later	  ability	  of	  environmental	  
stimulation	  to	  alter	  dendritic	  growth.	  Furthermore,	  she	  has	  shown	  that	  gonadal	  hormones	  
affect	  environmentally	  induced	  changes	  in	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  neocortex	  differently	  
(Juraska,	  1986).	  This	  type	  of	  hormonally	  mediated	  selective	  effect	  of	  experience	  on	  the	  brain	  is	  
important	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  route	  whereby	  experimental	  factors	  (including	  social	  factors)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Genomics is the study of the genotype. During the course of development, the genotype interacts with the 
environment in complex ways to produce the phenotype. It is the phenotypic expression of individual physical 
and behavioural characteristics that scientists study in an effort to understand how genes and the environment 
interact to produce each unique human being. Reference: Child Psychology: A Contemporary Viewpoint 
Updated, 5/e. Mavis E. Hetherington, University of Virginia, Ross D. Parke, University of CA at Riverside.  
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could	  influence	  the	  brain	  differently	  in	  males	  and	  females,	  leading	  to	  sex-­‐related	  variations	  in	  
the	  brain	  and	  behaviour	  (Kolb	  &	  Whishaw,	  1999).	  	  
	  
Differentiated	  Brain	  Organisation:	  Cognition	  and	  Gender	  	  
The	  theory	  of	  differentiated	  brain	  organisation	  and	  cognitive	  development	  proposes	  that	  
biological	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  brain	  partially	  determine	  gender	  development	  but	  that	  they	  rely	  
on	  cultural	  practices	  and	  stereotypical	  conceptions	  of	  gender	  to	  fully	  mature	  (Miller	  &	  
Halpern,	  2014).	  Physiologists	  who	  study	  the	  brain	  look	  specifically	  for	  cognitive	  explanations	  
that	  emphasise	  gendered	  difference,	  and	  for	  ways	  that	  biological	  logic	  varies	  between	  male	  
and	  female	  brains	  (Caplan	  &	  Caplan,	  1997).	  	  
	  
Theorists	  argue	  that	  because	  children	  learn	  about	  gender	  within	  a	  social	  environment,	  
biological	  mechanisms	  that	  define	  specific	  personality	  or	  ability	  characteristics	  are	  mediated	  
significantly	  by	  this	  interaction	  (Miller	  &	  Halpern,	  2014).	  The	  theory	  typically	  emphasises	  the	  
cognitive	  construction	  of	  gender	  conceptions	  within	  the	  family,	  arguing	  that	  identified	  roles	  
within	  the	  family	  unit	  cognitively	  influence	  how	  a	  child	  perceives	  their	  gender	  (Miller	  &	  
Halpern,	  2014).	  This	  model	  ultimately	  gives	  prominence	  to	  parents	  in	  influencing	  and	  
regulating	  gender-­‐linked	  conduct	  (Miller	  &	  Halpern,	  2014).	  With	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  individual,	  
cognitive	  developmental	  theory	  recognises	  the	  active	  role	  children	  play	  in	  their	  development,	  
privileging	  this	  theory	  over	  a	  social	  learning	  theory,	  which	  sees	  children	  more	  as	  passive	  
recipients	  of	  influences	  from	  their	  environment	  (Miller	  &	  Halpern,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Miller	  and	  Halpern	  (2014)	  claim	  that	  sex	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  abilities	  are	  changing	  and	  
vary	  across	  different	  populations.	  They	  assert	  that	  some	  gendered	  behavioural	  differences	  
found	  in	  infancy	  depend	  on	  task	  characteristics	  —	  for	  example,	  boys	  perform	  better	  at	  
activities	  including	  hand-­‐eye	  coordination	  in	  throwing	  tasks	  (Miller	  &	  Halpern,	  2014).	  But	  the	  
differences	  only	  occur	  because	  boys	  have	  more	  social	  opportunities	  than	  girls	  to	  practise	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throwing	  and	  sporting	  activities	  (Fine,	  2010).	  These	  findings	  indicate	  that	  modifying	  biological	  
and	  environmental	  factors	  could	  maximise	  cognitive	  potential,	  reducing	  differences	  between	  
‘sex’	  behaviours	  (Fine,	  2010).	  This	  conclusion	  illuminates	  cognitive	  theory’s	  usefulness	  in	  
describing	  how	  the	  environment	  influences	  biological	  factors.	  It	  also	  shows	  that	  purely	  
biological	  explanations	  of	  cognition	  and	  sex	  differences	  obscure	  that	  cultural	  factors	  may	  
mediate	  access	  to	  learning	  certain	  tasks	  based	  on	  gender	  assumptions,	  therefore	  preventing	  
cognitive	  development	  for	  some	  and	  increasing	  it	  for	  others	  (Caplan	  &	  Caplan,	  1997;	  Fine,	  
2010).	  
	  
Gender-­‐dependent	  differentiation	  of	  the	  brain	  is	  identified	  at	  every	  level	  of	  organisation	  —	  
morphological,	  neurochemical	  and	  functional,	  according	  to	  Chung	  and	  Auger	  (2013).	  Their	  
research	  indicates	  that	  gender	  differentiation	  is	  controlled	  primarily	  by	  sex	  differences	  in	  
gonadal	  steroid	  hormone	  levels	  during	  perinatal	  development	  (Chung	  &	  Auger,	  2013).	  They	  
looked	  at	  the	  variation	  of	  brain	  gender	  and	  identified	  an	  epigenetic	  process	  of	  DNA	  
methylation	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  cause	  of	  brain	  masculinisation.	  Suppression	  of	  this	  mechanism	  
allows	  brain	  feminisation	  (Chung	  &	  Auger,	  2013).	  They	  discovered	  that	  part	  of	  the	  brain	  
interpreted	  epigenetic	  events	  to	  differentiate	  the	  mind	  in	  a	  gender-­‐dependent	  method	  (Chung	  
&	  Auger,	  2013).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  sex	  hormones	  contribute	  to	  the	  brain’s	  acquisition	  
of	  feminine	  or	  masculine	  characteristics	  during	  prenatal	  development.	  (Chung	  &	  Auger,	  2013).	  	  
	  
The	  Biosocial	  Process	  of	  Becoming	  Gendered	  
Money	  was	  the	  first	  to	  integrate	  biology	  and	  environment.	  In	  1952,	  Money,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
doctorate	  that	  presented	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  intersex	  individuals,	  introduced	  the	  
term	  gender	  to	  describe	  sex-­‐linked	  characteristics	  (Germon,	  2009).	  He	  used	  this	  new	  
terminology	  as	  a	  rationale	  for	  clinical	  practices,	  and	  as	  a	  conceptual	  device	  for	  understanding	  
human	  subjectivity	  (Germon,	  2009,	  p.	  2).	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Money’s	  (1985)	  biosocial	  research	  took	  an	  interactionist	  approach	  to	  gender	  where	  both	  
nature	  and	  nurture	  play	  a	  role	  in	  gender	  formation.	  According	  to	  Money	  (1985),	  it	  was	  gender	  
and	  not	  sex	  that	  was	  an	  ‘umbrella	  term	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  totality	  of	  masculinity	  (and)	  
femininity,	  genital	  sex	  included’	  (p.	  71).	  Money	  considered	  that	  an	  individual’s	  gender	  role	  and	  
their	  gender	  identity	  are	  not	  separate	  aspects	  but	  are	  rather	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  idea	  (1985).	  
He	  proposed	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  gendered	  states	  are	  the	  result	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture	  
interacting	  ‘at	  crucial	  periods	  of	  developmental	  differentiation’	  (1985).	  
	  
Money	  and	  Ehrhardt’s	  paper	  (1972)	  presented	  the	  theory	  that	  once	  a	  biological	  male	  or	  female	  
is	  born,	  social	  labelling	  and	  differential	  treatment	  interact	  with	  biological	  factors	  to	  steer	  
development.	  Money	  was	  particularly	  interested	  in	  intersexed	  individuals	  because	  both	  
medical	  and	  social	  issues	  relating	  to	  this	  area	  remained	  largely	  unexplored	  when	  he	  wrote	  
(Germon,	  2009).	  Money	  (1985)	  saw	  the	  potential	  to	  help	  intersexed	  individuals	  integrate	  into	  
society	  and	  hoped	  to	  minimise	  the	  hardship	  of	  living	  in	  between	  the	  sexes.	  Money	  believed	  
that	  if	  nature	  and	  nurture	  could	  be	  interrupted	  early	  enough	  in	  an	  infant’s	  life	  (through	  
surgical	  mutation	  of	  genitals	  to	  make	  a	  child	  a	  male	  or	  a	  female),	  the	  nurturing	  aspect	  would	  
help	  avoid	  internal	  conflict	  (1985).	  He	  reasoned	  that	  if	  a	  child	  had	  the	  ‘normal’	  parts	  of	  a	  
particular	  sex	  and	  was	  then	  raised	  according	  to	  that	  gender,	  they	  would	  develop	  the	  
sex/gender	  alignment	  understood	  through	  biological	  terms	  (1985).	  Although	  Money’s	  
research	  and	  writings	  focused	  on	  showing	  how	  social	  constructs	  are	  negotiated	  to	  create	  
‘gendered’	  identities,	  his	  work	  helped	  to	  develop	  the	  theory	  that	  all	  gender	  is	  mediated	  by	  a	  
series	  of	  events	  and	  interactions	  with	  biology	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992).	  
	  
Current	  data	  suggests	  that	  intersexuality	  is	  more	  common	  than	  was	  historically	  thought.	  	  
Based	  on	  evidence,	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  calculates	  ‘that	  for	  every	  1000	  children	  born,	  seventeen	  are	  
intersexual	  in	  some	  form’	  (2000,	  p.	  20).	  Intersexed	  individuals	  present	  a	  significant	  problem	  
for	  binary	  perspectives	  of	  gender	  and	  for	  identifying	  behavioural	  traits	  as	  gendered	  and	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aligned	  with	  sex	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1993).	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  argues	  that	  intersexed	  infants	  should	  
not	  be	  subjected	  to	  medical	  intervention	  or	  an	  assignment	  of	  sex	  (2000).	  Rather,	  she	  argues	  
that	  intersexed	  children	  fall	  into	  the	  statistical	  variability	  of	  normal	  and	  as	  such	  should	  be	  left	  
to	  form	  their	  gender	  over	  time	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  2000,	  p.	  21).	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  (1992,	  1993,	  
2000,	  2000b,	  2003)	  illuminates	  that	  intersexed	  individuals	  are	  significantly	  constrained	  by	  
binary	  assumptions,	  which	  shape	  medical	  practices	  and	  determine	  how	  intersexed	  individuals	  
are	  identified,	  treated	  and	  categorised.	  
	  
Socialisation	  as	  a	  Biosocial	  Process	  	  
A	  biosocial	  description	  sees	  biology	  and	  social	  agreements	  as	  interconnected	  at	  the	  most	  
fundamentals	  of	  levels.	  Biosocial	  theorists	  argue	  that	  socialisation	  builds	  on	  characteristic	  
human	  traits	  that	  they	  describe	  as	  evolutionary,	  such	  as	  the	  tendency	  to	  imitate	  others	  and	  to	  
engage	  in	  social	  processes	  of	  competition,	  collaborative	  learning	  and	  teaching	  (Hill,	  Barton,	  &	  
Hurtado,	  2009).	  These	  tendencies	  orient	  children	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  and	  quickly	  acquire	  skills	  
and	  knowledge	  suited	  to	  the	  societal	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  live	  (Hill,	  Barton,	  &	  Hurtado,	  
2009).	  Socialisation	  interacts	  with	  gene	  expression	  to	  influence	  behavioural	  configurations	  
and	  biological	  outcomes	  (Lickliter	  &	  Honeycutt,	  2003).	  Socialisation	  is	  ‘where	  individuals	  
become	  familiar’	  with	  the	  cultural	  rules	  of	  ‘appropriate	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  behavior’	  
(Ryle,	  2014,	  p.	  120).	  Socialisation	  is	  integral	  as	  ‘part	  of	  the	  way	  that	  we	  internalize	  our	  
biological	  understandings	  of	  sex	  categorization	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  masculine	  and	  
feminine	  demonstration	  that	  helps	  us	  to	  form	  our	  gender	  identity’	  (Ryle,	  2014).	  Through	  a	  
biosocial	  process,	  we	  learn	  to	  become	  gendered	  internally	  and	  as	  members	  of	  society	  (Ryle,	  
2014).	  	  
	  
Scientific	  Knowledge	  and	  Gender	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  discuss	  Western	  science’s	  role	  in	  constructing	  categories	  of	  difference	  and	  
how	  this	  is	  significant	  to	  the	  biosocial	  theory	  of	  gender.	  According	  to	  Grewal	  and	  Kaplan	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(2006),	  the	  ‘categories	  that	  science	  creates	  are	  often	  perceived	  as	  truths	  that	  cannot	  be	  
challenged’	  (p.	  1).	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  (1992,	  2000,	  2003)	  and	  Richardson	  (2014)	  also	  both	  argue	  
that	  scientific	  data	  often	  excludes	  credible	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  gender	  diversity.	  They	  
argue	  that	  science	  supports	  an	  alternative	  hypothesis	  that	  perpetuates	  understandings	  of	  
gender	  founded	  on	  essentialist	  concepts.	  As	  a	  result,	  scientific	  discourse	  itself	  becomes	  an	  
environmental	  or	  ‘social’	  aspect	  that	  mediates	  gender	  interpretations	  (Fine,	  2010;	  Fausto-­‐
Sterling,	  1992,	  2000,	  2003;	  Richardson,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Fausto-­‐Sterling	  (1992,	  2003)	  argues	  that	  scientific	  discourse	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  biological	  
or	  social	  gender	  reality,	  instead	  creating	  overriding	  meanings	  and	  definitions	  that	  take	  
precedence	  over	  experienced	  reality.	  Fausto-­‐Sterling’s	  (2003)	  research	  has	  identified	  genetic	  
interactions	  that	  suggest	  gender	  is	  not	  constant	  —	  small	  genetic	  variations	  occur	  continuously	  
—	  and	  that,	  in	  fact,	  social	  mechanisms	  predominantly	  govern	  gender-­‐linked	  demeanor.	  She	  
also	  addresses	  the	  need	  for	  more	  extensive	  sex	  definitions,	  claiming	  that	  sex	  descriptions	  
make	  our	  understandings	  of	  gender	  ambiguous	  and	  coercive	  toward	  dimorphic	  categorisation	  
that	  fixes	  individuals	  into	  categorical	  conceptual	  definitions	  (1992,	  2003).	  She	  points	  outs	  that	  
scientific	  dialogue	  should	  instead	  argue	  that	  gender	  identity	  presumably	  emerges	  from	  all	  of	  
those	  corporeal	  aspects	  via	  interaction	  with	  environment	  and	  experience	  (1992,	  2003).	  She	  
argues	  that	  current	  biological	  and	  social	  conceptions	  of	  gender	  maintain	  and	  reinforce	  
structural	  systems	  and	  cultural	  constructs	  (2000,	  2003).	  	  
	  
Richardson’s	  (2014)	  work	  also	  examines	  the	  interaction	  between	  cultural	  gender	  norms	  and	  
genetic	  theories	  of	  sex,	  but	  does	  so	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  critical	  discourse	  analysis.	  Her	  
discussion	  illuminates	  that	  understandings	  of	  epigenetic	  research	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  
of	  two	  gender	  traits	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine,	  which	  weighs	  heavily	  on	  the	  gender	  
perceptions	  portrayed	  through	  the	  research	  (Richardson,	  2014).	  Richardson	  specifically	  
critiques	  sex	  chromosome	  research,	  arguing	  that	  information	  is	  collected	  to	  maintain	  certain	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theories	  of	  gender	  that	  are	  not	  accurate	  and	  do	  not	  represent	  a	  diverse	  selection	  of	  gender	  
characteristics	  (Richardson,	  2014).	  She	  argues	  that	  scientific	  discourse’s	  denial	  of	  the	  
interactions	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture	  creates	  a	  language	  of	  gender	  that	  alters	  how	  society	  
reduces	  legitimate	  representations	  of	  gender	  to	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  stereotypes	  and	  
characteristics	  (Richardson,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Richardson	  (2014)	  maintains	  that	  the	  institutional	  body	  of	  science	  that	  drives	  genetic	  research	  
is	  motivated	  to	  support	  theory	  that	  males	  are	  stronger	  than	  females	  and	  that	  clear	  distinctions	  
support	  the	  binary	  divisions.	  She	  believes	  that	  explicit	  generated	  knowledge	  alters	  gender	  
perceptions	  and	  the	  way	  that	  groups	  and	  individuals	  respond	  to	  their	  experience	  of	  gender,	  
meaning	  that	  certain	  aspects	  of	  gender	  are	  accentuated	  through	  authority	  and	  are	  legitimised	  
as	  genuine	  and	  factual	  (Richardson,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Critique	  of	  the	  Biosocial	  Approach	  
Biosocial	  concepts	  of	  gender	  are	  often	  critiqued	  by	  empirical	  science	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
definitive	  or	  consistent	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  methodological	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  
research	  (Ridley,	  2003).	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  in	  a	  study	  of	  heritability	  that	  refers	  only	  to	  the	  
degree	  of	  genetic	  variation	  between	  people	  or	  a	  trait,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  percentage	  of	  a	  trait	  of	  a	  
particular	  individual	  that	  is	  due	  to	  environmental	  or	  genetic	  factors	  (Ridley,	  2003).	  The	  
limitations	  of	  the	  process	  also	  constrain	  theorists’	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  level	  to	  which	  they	  
cause	  or	  create	  any	  gender	  variance.	  The	  search	  for	  a	  hormonal	  basis	  of	  differences	  in	  social	  
behaviour	  has	  also	  produced	  conflicting	  results	  (Ridley,	  2003).	  	  
	  
Another	  critique	  of	  the	  biosocial	  approach	  is	  that	  environmental	  factors	  thought	  to	  mediate	  
gender	  within	  this	  approach	  are	  highly	  interdependent,	  further	  complicating	  an	  accurate	  
assessment	  of	  which,	  if	  any,	  is	  predominant	  (Fine,	  2010).	  Because	  social	  factors	  are	  not	  always	  
consistent,	  researchers	  sometimes	  have	  difficulty	  separating	  hormonal	  from	  social	  influences	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(Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992,	  2003).	  As	  a	  result,	  theorists	  are	  restricted	  to	  discussing	  ‘environmental’	  
factors	  of	  gender	  as	  they	  appear	  from	  outside,	  as	  experienced	  from	  an	  individual	  perspective,	  
and	  as	  scientific	  methods	  allow.	  This	  further	  exemplifies	  that	  the	  epistemology	  behind	  the	  
scientific	  authority	  that	  interprets	  biological	  meanings	  and	  creates	  the	  ‘legitimate’	  terminology	  
of	  current	  scientific	  opinion	  constrains	  biological	  knowledge	  that	  might	  extend	  




As	  I	  have	  shown,	  theorists	  adopt	  a	  biosocial	  approach	  that	  explains	  nature	  and	  nurture	  
interacting	  because	  it	  enables	  an	  inclusive	  and	  flexible	  understanding	  of	  gender	  that	  does	  not	  
deny	  the	  relationship	  and	  importance	  of	  both	  biological	  and	  environmental	  aspects	  (Fausto-­‐
Sterling,	  1993,	  2000,	  2003).	  The	  theory	  is	  flexible	  because	  it	  does	  not	  exclusively	  align	  with	  
either	  biological	  or	  constructed	  definitions	  of	  gender,	  allowing	  for	  a	  more	  flexible	  analysis	  of	  
biology	  that	  is	  not	  fully	  encumbered	  by	  the	  values	  and	  interpretations	  of	  scientists	  
(Richardson,	  2014;	  Richardson	  &	  Stevens,	  2015).	  	  
	  
Biosocial	  models	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  human	  diversity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	  illuminating	  
important	  aspects	  of	  gender	  characteristics,	  gender-­‐role	  development	  and	  functioning.	  
Biosocial	  theory	  specifies	  how	  gender	  conceptions	  are	  constructed	  from	  the	  complex	  mix	  of	  
experiences	  and	  biological	  mechanisms	  that	  interact	  to	  create	  gender-­‐linked	  conduct	  
throughout	  an	  individual's	  life.	  The	  theory	  integrates	  biological,	  environmental	  and	  
sociostructural	  determinants	  that	  help	  to	  provide	  a	  conceptual	  platform	  that	  permits	  a	  range	  
of	  possibilities	  rather	  than	  dictating	  a	  rigid	  type	  of	  gender	  differentiation.	  
	  
Biosocial	  theories	  are	  a	  valuable	  method	  of	  conceptualising	  gender	  because	  they	  include	  
aspects	  of	  complementary	  theoretical	  approaches	  while	  subverting	  linear	  aspects	  of	  those	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approaches	  that	  constrain	  the	  scope	  for	  understanding	  interdependent	  factors.	  The	  biosocial	  
approach	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  consider	  biological	  influences	  of	  sex	  and	  physiological	  
differences	  in	  behaviour	  as	  fluid	  and	  diverse	  characteristics	  of	  gender	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  or	  
experienced	  by	  any	  individual	  of	  any	  identification	  of	  sex	  or	  gender	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992).	  	  
	  
A	  fundamental	  concern	  of	  the	  biosocial	  approach	  is	  to	  show	  that	  gender	  cannot	  be	  solely	  
described	  within	  an	  individual	  or	  singular	  context.	  Although	  biosocial	  models	  endeavour	  to	  
discuss	  gender	  beyond	  the	  binary	  model,	  they	  draw	  on	  scientific	  and	  medical	  models	  that	  
revert	  to	  binary	  interpretations.	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  clearly	  argues	  for	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  
diversity	  concerning	  both	  sex	  and	  gender,	  reinforcing	  the	  need	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  
model	  that	  enables	  better	  representation	  of	  diverse	  gender	  on	  a	  non-­‐oppositional	  continuum.	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CHAPTER	  FIVE:	  THE	  COLOUR-­‐WHEEL	  OF	  GENDER	  DIVERSITY	  
	  
Introduction	  
This	  section	  introduces	  the	  ‘Colour-­‐Wheel	  of	  Gender	  Diversity’,	  an	  explanatory	  model	  that	  
focuses	  primarily	  on	  describing	  and	  explaining	  gender	  as	  fluid.	  This	  model	  is	  represented	  as	  a	  
spectrum	  of	  gradients	  showing	  that	  gender	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  values	  as	  
conceptualised	  through	  masculinity	  and	  femininity,	  but	  can	  vary	  within	  a	  continuum.	  To	  
conceptualise	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  model,	  this	  work	  has	  drawn	  upon	  theoretical	  knowledge	  
from	  the	  three	  strands:	  biology,	  biosocial	  and	  social	  constructionism.	  Each	  of	  these	  strands	  
contributes	  interpretations	  of	  gender	  that	  help	  to	  describe	  gender	  as	  a	  complex	  and	  meaning-­‐
based	  phenomena.	  	  
	  
As	  previous	  examined,	  all	  theories	  discussed	  as	  foundational	  to	  this	  model	  present	  evidence	  
that	  challenges	  a	  binary	  model	  of	  gender.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  disrupting	  the	  
binary,	  they	  often	  draw	  from	  the	  binary	  and	  default	  back	  to	  it.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  was	  necessary	  
to	  develop	  a	  model	  from	  the	  ground	  up.	  The	  key	  elements	  are	  discussed	  and	  examined	  with	  
the	  focus	  of	  describing	  a	  model	  that	  is	  conceptually	  different	  from	  the	  binary	  (being	  
problematical	  to	  represent	  in	  any	  linear	  way)	  while	  providing	  room	  for	  understood	  concepts	  
of	  gender,	  with	  a	  new,	  revitalised	  interpretation	  that	  allows	  for	  an	  expressive	  representation	  
of	  gender	  fluidity.	  	  
	  
I	  will	  first	  look	  at	  the	  methodology	  that	  was	  used	  to	  resolve	  what	  kind	  of	  model	  was	  needed	  
and	  address	  issues	  of	  key	  elements	  that	  are	  not	  addressed	  through	  current	  models	  of	  gender.	  
Second,	  I	  will	  discuss	  masculinity	  and	  femininity,	  showing	  some	  processing	  diagrams	  that	  
examine	  current	  concepts	  of	  gender	  in	  a	  binary	  model.	  I	  present	  information	  to	  show	  that	  
reformulating	  the	  binary	  to	  include	  more	  categories	  does	  not	  extend	  gender	  further	  but	  rather	  
reproduces	  similar	  results	  that	  do	  not	  allow	  for	  fluid	  or	  diverse	  understandings	  of	  gender.	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Third,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  shape	  and	  the	  colours,	  explaining	  the	  presentation	  of	  these	  elements.	  I	  
will	  reflect	  on	  their	  function	  and	  purpose,	  and	  discuss	  how	  gender	  can	  be	  discovered	  through	  
engagement	  with	  the	  model.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  review	  the	  model	  as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
Methodology:	  Creating	  a	  Model	  of	  Gender	  Representing	  Diversity	  and	  Fluidity	  
I	  began	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  origins	  of	  binary	  logic	  traced	  to	  Aristotle	  (contraries),	  suggesting	  the	  
binary	  dichotomy	  can	  be	  factual	  but	  is	  more	  often	  only	  a	  simplification	  (Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1993).	  
The	  duality	  of	  the	  male/female	  division	  is	  not	  helpful	  as	  a	  description	  of	  reality/experience.	  
Biologically	  informed	  concepts	  of	  sexuality/gender	  are	  incomplete	  and	  often	  distracting	  and	  
unhelpful.	  
	  
	   	   	  
Male/Female/Intersexed	  	  
Figure	  1.1	  A	  three-­‐category	  classification	  scheme	  for	  biological	  sex.	  
	  
I	  then	  considered	  how	  we	  could	  extend	  this	  concept.	  The	  concept	  needs	  to	  consider	  a	  spectrum	  
of	  values	  between	  two	  (so-­‐called)	  opposites.	  Some	  thinkers	  introduce	  many	  binaries	  and	  
consider	  spectra	  as	  a	  classification	  scheme	  with	  more	  scope,	  and	  yet	  they	  remain	  
fundamentally	  rooted	  in	  the	  binary	  dialectic.	  An	  aside	  on	  biology/physics:	  an	  extension	  of	  
binary	  logic	  exists,	  namely	  ternary	  logic:	  relationships	  between	  three	  categories.	  As	  shown	  in	  
figures	  1.1	  and	  1.2,	  an	  additional	  category	  that	  complements	  the	  binary	  can	  be	  introduced	  for	  
both	  sex	  and	  gender.	  
	  
	  	   	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  
Feminine/Masculine/Androgynous	  
Figure	  1.2	  A	  three-­‐category	  classification	  scheme	  for	  gender.	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Humans	  interpret	  light	  using	  three	  complementary	  colours	  (a	  ternary)	  generating	  a	  closed	  
spectrum.	  We	  can	  express	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  three	  colours	  and	  their	  continuous	  
spectrum	  on	  a	  colour	  wheel,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.2.	  This	  extension	  of	  binary	  logic	  provides	  our	  
motivation	  to	  express	  gender	  as	  a	  colour-­‐wheel,	  removing	  strict	  categories	  and	  their	  
opposition	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  colour-­‐wheel	  idea	  could	  be	  further	  extended	  to	  express	  
complexities	  of	  gender	  through	  a	  series	  of	  overlapping	  spectrums	  in	  the	  form	  of	  multiple	  
colour-­‐wheels.	  This	  argument	  acknowledges	  the	  crucial	  differences	  between	  the	  theoretical	  
perspectives	  of	  biology,	  biosocial	  and	  social	  construction	  of	  gender.	  A	  key	  argument	  is	  that	  no	  
one	  approach	  provides	  an	  encompassing	  explanation	  of	  gender,	  necessitating	  a	  more	  fluid	  
approach.	  The	  meanings	  embedded	  in	  our	  understandings	  of	  gender	  are	  complex,	  and	  
questions	  about	  them	  are	  not	  easily	  rectified.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.3	  Extending	  binary	  and	  ternary	  logic	  to	  a	  continuous	  spectrum.	  The	  three	  categories	  
of	  ternary	  logic	  are	  readily	  represented	  as	  a	  continuous	  spectrum	  that	  is	  periodic.	  This	  is	  also	  
similar	  to	  the	  way	  the	  eye	  interprets	  the	  visible	  light	  spectrum	  to	  produce	  the	  continuous	  
experience	  of	  colour.	  
	  
binary





	   61	  
Shifting	  Focus	  from	  Masculine	  and	  Feminine	  Conceptualisation	  
Critiques	  of	  the	  binary	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  gender	  reveal	  that	  individuals	  are	  limited	  socially	  to	  
perceiving	  themselves	  primarily	  within	  binary	  constructs	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  
(Butler,	  1990,	  2004;	  Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1992,	  1993,	  2000,	  2000b,	  2003;	  Richardson,	  2014).	  In	  the	  
binary,	  units	  are	  placed	  alongside	  one	  another	  founded	  on	  reciprocal	  determination	  forming	  a	  
binary	  code	  of	  those	  subjects.	  The	  binary	  contains	  units	  that	  have	  value	  or	  meaning,	  and	  we	  
unconsciously	  use	  these	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  each	  unit	  is	  defined	  in	  
reciprocal	  determination	  with	  another	  term,	  as	  in	  binary	  code.	  This	  relation	  is	  not	  
contradictory	  but	  rather	  is	  structural	  and	  complementary.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  relationship	  can	  
be	  seen	  in	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’.	  	  
	  
Binary	  logic	  is	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  that	  everything	  is	  either	  A	  or	  not–A	  (Aristotle).	  In	  this	  
format,	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  are	  represented	  as	  opposites	  in	  the	  binary,	  and	  each	  is	  thought	  
to	  be	  mutually	  exclusive	  from	  the	  other.	  The	  binary	  assumes	  that	  the	  meanings	  of	  each	  
category	  are	  constant	  and	  fixed.	  The	  binary	  recognises	  simplified	  understandings	  and	  enables	  
the	  production	  of	  statistical	  data	  in	  areas	  containing	  limited	  sets	  of	  variables.	  Scientific	  
application	  of	  the	  binary	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  is	  not	  so	  easily	  rectified,	  because	  variables	  
contributing	  to	  gendered	  concepts	  are	  numerous	  and	  diverse.	  Genuine	  experience	  becomes	  
arbitrary	  due	  to	  the	  meaning	  reinforced	  through	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  binary	  and	  the	  authority	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Figure	  2.1	  Processing	  models	  of	  gender.	  
	  
The	  processing	  model	  of	  gender,	  Figure	  2.1,	  shows	  how	  the	  binary	  gender	  model	  looks	  when	  
shifted	  into	  a	  new	  form.	  The	  first	  model	  diagram	  (left)	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  still	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  
gender	  that	  dominates	  all	  other	  versions	  of	  gender.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  processing	  model	  above	  
left,	  having	  rigidly	  defined	  zones	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  creates	  an	  expectation	  that	  certain	  
behaviours	  and	  roles	  belong	  to	  rigidly	  defined	  groups	  of	  individuals.	  The	  second	  processing	  
model	  (right)	  shows	  that	  the	  first	  step	  is	  to	  remove	  the	  rigid	  hierarchy	  of	  categories;	  this	  
occurs	  by	  transposing	  them	  into	  a	  circle.	  	  
	  
Although	  I	  have	  considered	  dismantling	  the	  terms	  of	  masculine/feminine,	  this	  change	  is	  
dramatic	  and	  would	  undermine	  the	  intention	  of	  providing	  a	  dynamic	  system	  where	  any	  
version	  of	  gender	  may	  be	  represented.	  It	  is	  less	  constraining	  to	  attempt	  a	  disruption	  of	  
understanding	  that	  allows	  scope	  for	  these	  terms	  to	  expand	  and	  alter,	  providing	  insight	  into	  
more	  fluid	  definitions	  of	  them.	  Furthermore,	  the	  complete	  removal	  of	  these	  concepts	  also	  has	  
the	  potential	  to	  undermine	  human	  expression	  as	  aspects	  of	  gendered	  experience	  are	  intangible	  
and	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  self.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  a	  compromise	  where	  
we	  may	  use	  current	  concepts	  to	  integrate	  and	  develop	  new	  ones.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  masculine	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and	  feminine	  become	  conceptualised	  as	  different	  aspects	  of	  all	  genders,	  rather	  than	  
explanations	  or	  stereotypes	  of	  separated	  and	  assumed	  sex/gender	  alignments.	  They	  are	  also	  
important	  understandings	  that	  complement	  our	  perceptions	  of	  self,	  recognising	  that	  an	  
individual	  can	  experience	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  gender.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  spectrum	  needs	  to	  
offer	  a	  perspective	  that	  includes	  complex	  and	  non-­‐complex	  interpretations	  of	  gender.	  	  
	  
In	  our	  everyday	  activities,	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  to	  shift	  through	  various	  behaviours	  and	  to	  
express	  ourselves	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  These	  shifts	  incorporate	  fluid	  behaviours	  that	  pass	  
through	  various	  representations	  of	  gender.	  Performances	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  
behaviours	  and	  actions	  may	  be	  culturally	  restricted,	  but	  these	  are	  not	  lived	  strictly	  in	  everyday	  
life.	  At	  the	  social	  level,	  gender	  has	  reinforced	  meanings	  that	  divide,	  enable	  cultural	  imperialism	  
and	  structures	  of	  power,	  and	  define	  roles,	  expectations	  and	  behaviours.	  At	  this	  level,	  legitimate	  
or	  non-­‐legitimate	  definitions	  of	  gender	  exist	  in	  their	  most	  limiting	  form.	  The	  challenge,	  
therefore,	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  model	  of	  gender	  that	  enables	  a	  slow	  deconstruction	  and	  diversion	  of	  
traditional	  concepts	  of	  gender.	  
	  
The	  Gender	  Colour-­‐Wheel	  of	  Diversity:	  The	  Key	  Features	  	  
Shape	  
The	  wheel	  or	  disc	  shape	  is	  designed	  to	  facilitate	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  binary	  of	  two	  ends	  to	  a	  
multidimensional	  sphere	  that	  encompasses	  gender	  as	  an	  entire	  idea	  without	  creating	  rigidly	  
defined	  categorisations	  that	  constrain	  the	  ability	  to	  express	  diversity.	  	  
	  
The	  disc	  shape	  was	  chosen	  to	  promote	  variation	  because	  it	  has	  no	  beginning	  or	  end.	  The	  shape	  
and	  format	  are	  specifically	  designed	  to	  describe	  an	  understanding	  of	  gender	  where	  none	  are	  
hierarchical	  over	  others.	  This	  model	  recognises	  that	  gender	  identities	  are	  fluid	  and	  contingent,	  
and	  that	  they	  develop	  about	  particular	  social,	  cultural	  and	  historical	  circumstances.	  We	  can	  
	   64	  
consider	  gender	  fluidity	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  conveys	  a	  wider,	  more	  flexible	  range	  of	  
expression.	  	  
	  
Another	  benefit	  is	  that	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  circle	  helps	  to	  minimise	  categorical	  implications.	  
All	  areas	  of	  the	  model	  are	  equal	  and	  have	  equivalent	  values,	  allowing	  new	  inclusions	  when	  
required.	  The	  model	  also	  allows	  for	  new	  understandings	  and	  identifications	  as	  they	  are	  
discovered	  and	  understood.	  Embracing	  differences	  in	  people	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  challenge,	  but	  it	  is	  
the	  only	  way	  we	  can	  expand	  our	  understandings,	  taking	  our	  knowledge	  of	  our	  bodies	  and	  our	  
social	  differences	  to	  a	  new	  realm	  that	  is	  interesting,	  colourful	  and	  vibrant.	  	  
	  
The	  Colour-­‐Wheel	  Conceptual	  Areas	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  colour-­‐wheel	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  entire	  wheel	  represents	  gender	  
that	  in	  its	  most	  fundamental	  form	  is	  not	  masculinised	  or	  feminised.	  The	  wheel	  represents	  all	  
gender,	  including	  androgynous	  aspects,	  meaning	  that	  all	  areas	  are	  necessary	  for	  gender	  to	  be	  
complete.	  All	  parts	  and	  participants	  are	  relevant.	  It	  does	  not	  specifically	  include	  a	  designated	  
area,	  or	  colour,	  for	  androgyny	  because	  separating	  androgyny	  once	  again	  brings	  gender	  into	  
binary	  foundations,	  which	  promotes	  division	  of	  gender	  characteristics	  into	  areas	  that	  are	  not	  
fluid.	  Androgyny	  is	  noted	  as	  belonging	  to	  all	  areas	  of	  the	  wheel,	  presenting	  itself	  in	  many	  
variations	  of	  gender	  with	  multiple	  continuous	  descriptions.	  	  
	  
Two	  areas	  are	  recognised	  as	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  current	  gender	  
concepts.	  Gradients	  range	  from	  hyper	  examples	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  through	  to	  dualistic	  
experiences	  of	  both.	  These	  are	  the	  primary	  areas	  of	  blue	  for	  masculine	  and	  red	  for	  feminine.	  
Yellow	  is	  an	  area	  where	  gender	  is	  recognised	  outside	  of	  traditional	  concepts.	  The	  yellow	  
gradient	  area	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  represent	  examples	  of	  non-­‐gendered	  identity,	  alternative	  
gender,	  or	  degendered	  identities	  or	  experiences.	  There	  are	  also	  areas	  that	  enable	  new	  
expressions	  and	  interpretations,	  which	  may	  facilitate	  discussions	  of	  androgynous	  variations.	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The	  model	  also	  provides	  a	  forum	  to	  challenge	  existing	  categorisations	  and	  structures	  that	  
reinforce	  rigid	  normative	  expectations	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  by	  creating	  space	  to	  
establish	  diverse	  representations.	  Masculine	  and	  feminine	  are	  needed	  for	  now,	  but	  the	  
definition	  of	  these	  terms	  is	  contingent	  and	  flexible.	  	  
	  
Theory	  behind	  the	  Colours	  
The	  colours	  in	  the	  graph	  represent	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  colour-­‐wheel.	  Colours	  are	  used	  to	  
describe	  gender.	  Unidentified	  zones	  of	  colour	  have	  gradients	  from	  one	  zone	  into	  the	  next.	  	  
	  
A	  representation	  of	  the	  Colour-­‐Wheel	  of	  Gender	  Diversity	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.1.	  This	  new	  
version	  has	  all	  the	  colours,	  allowing	  for	  a	  genuine	  spectrum.	  The	  coloured	  zones	  represent	  
diversity	  and	  possible	  variables.	  Blue	  (cyan)	  through	  to	  green	  and	  red	  (magenta)	  through	  to	  
yellow	  represents	  areas	  understood	  through	  primary	  historical	  meanings	  of	  gender.	  The	  other	  
colours	  in	  the	  model	  allow	  for	  alternate	  versions	  of	  gender	  understanding.	  Green-­‐yellow	  are	  
new	  areas	  of	  gender.	  An	  individual	  is	  also	  not	  limited	  to	  placing	  their	  gender	  in	  one	  location,	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Figure	  3.1	  shows	  an	  example	  where	  an	  individual	  may	  place	  themselves	  in	  the	  gradient	  of	  
femininity	  heading	  into	  masculinity.	  This	  individual,	  for	  example,	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  
intersexed,	  but	  they	  recognize	  their	  gender	  as	  spanning	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  feminine	  
characteristics	  and	  with	  a	  lesser	  amount	  of	  non-­‐hyper	  masculine	  characteristics.	  First,	  this	  
shows	  that	  individuals	  can	  place	  themselves	  anywhere	  in	  the	  colour-­‐wheel,	  without	  
disenfranchising	  any	  other	  positions	  on	  the	  wheel.	  Second,	  it	  enables	  the	  individual	  to	  
recognise	  characteristics	  that	  fall	  across	  genders.	  The	  model	  endeavours	  to	  create	  a	  space	  that	  
encourages	  a	  more	  multidimensional	  application	  of	  gender	  characteristics	  within	  a	  continuous	  
spectrum.	  Rather	  than	  the	  two	  distinct	  boxes	  systematised	  by	  the	  binary	  of	  gender,	  gender	  
occurs	  across	  a	  continuum	  of	  possibilities	  and	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  independently	  characterised	  
across	  a	  range	  of	  possibilities.	  	  
	  
The	  colour-­‐wheel	  does	  not	  required	  specific	  definitions	  of	  masculine	  and	  feminine;	  instead	  it	  
allows	  for	  all	  presently	  articulated	  and	  non-­‐articulated	  understandings	  of	  gender.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.2	  Colour-­‐Wheel	  of	  Gender	  Diversity:	  spanning	  different	  states	  of	  gender.	  
The	  example	  above	  shows	  how	  someone	  may	  ‘find’	  or	  identify	  their	  gender	  within	  this	  model.	  
The	  figure	  shows	  the	  area	  where	  an	  individual	  may	  feel	  that	  their	  gender	  can	  be	  represented.	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As	  shown,	  the	  marked	  area	  spans	  across	  the	  concept	  of	  masculinity	  and	  through	  into	  the	  
gradient	  of	  greens.	  This	  individual	  may	  recognise	  their	  gender	  as	  having	  some	  masculine	  
characteristics,	  but	  not	  at	  all	  times	  or	  in	  all	  areas	  of	  their	  identification.	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  
individual	  may	  be	  identified	  as	  any	  sex	  identity	  (as	  sex	  identity	  is	  not	  of	  specific	  relevance	  to	  
the	  experience	  of	  gender).	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  and	  Discussion	  
In	  this	  work,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  gender	  diversity	  is	  not	  a	  two-­‐ended	  dichotomous	  concept,	  and	  
therefore	  it	  should	  not	  be	  represented	  as	  such.	  When	  applying	  the	  binary	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  
gender,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  expansive	  range	  of	  variables	  constrains	  the	  foundation	  of	  
the	  binary	  design,	  stretching	  its	  ability	  to	  deliver	  adequate	  comparisons.	  Without	  gender,	  
many	  aspects	  of	  how	  we	  identify	  ourselves	  would	  become	  troubling,	  possibly	  even	  oppressive,	  
for	  those	  who	  identify	  strongly	  with	  the	  creative	  nature	  of	  their	  gender	  experience.	  And	  yet,	  as	  
describe	  by	  theorists	  (Butler,	  1990,	  2004;	  Lorber,	  1993;	  Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  1993,	  2000,	  2003),	  
gender	  is	  not	  distinctly	  natural	  but	  is	  instead	  constructed	  through	  discourse.	  	  
	  
Gender	  is	  both	  a	  very	  public	  and	  a	  very	  private	  aspect	  of	  identification.	  For	  all	  versions	  of	  what	  
it	  is	  to	  be	  male/female	  or	  human,	  we	  identify	  individual	  aspects	  of	  our	  gender.	  Moreover,	  at	  
some	  point	  in	  our	  lives,	  most	  of	  us	  will	  have	  at	  least	  one	  experience	  where	  our	  behaviour	  
deviates	  from	  this	  dichotomy.	  For	  some	  individuals,	  gendered	  behaviour	  changes	  constantly	  
along	  the	  continuum	  of	  (socially	  perceived)	  masculine	  and	  feminine	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
As	  part	  of	  this	  work,	  I	  have	  addressed	  concerns	  about	  how	  to	  synthesise	  the	  terms	  masculine	  
and	  feminine	  to	  gain	  new	  perspectives	  on	  gender.	  The	  relevant	  theory	  demonstrates	  that	  an	  
individual’s	  experience	  of	  gender	  cannot	  be	  explained	  and	  discussed	  as	  a	  fixed	  entity,	  
suggesting	  theoretical	  generalisations	  describing	  the	  ‘nature’	  of	  gender	  are	  problematic.	  Due	  
to	  the	  variables	  of	  individual	  lives	  and	  cultural	  influences,	  gendered	  expressions	  can	  be	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described	  as	  shifting	  throughout	  our	  lives	  and	  depend	  on	  social	  environments	  and	  given	  
situations.	  	  
	  
Sociologically,	  a	  discussion	  of	  gender	  is	  most	  comfortable	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  socialisation	  
and	  social	  constructionism.	  And	  yet	  biological	  investigations	  of	  gender	  also	  reveal	  that	  gender	  
is	  not	  dichotomous	  and	  thus	  are	  valuable	  to	  the	  examination	  of	  gender	  as	  fluid	  and	  diverse.	  If	  
we	  are	  going	  to	  shift	  views	  that	  reinforce	  gender	  differences,	  then	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  biological	  
examinations	  of	  gender	  can	  add	  to	  a	  description	  of	  how	  gender	  formation	  occurs	  from	  a	  broad	  
and	  encompassing	  perspective.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  necessary	  to	  disentangle	  sex	  and	  gender	  assumptions	  from	  scientific	  and	  social	  concerns,	  
being	  mindful	  of	  how	  these	  assumptions	  alter	  the	  way	  we	  perceive	  research	  results.	  We	  cannot	  
ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  understandings	  based	  in	  the	  binary	  dichotomy	  of	  gender	  categories	  
influence	  the	  way	  we	  view	  and	  assess	  gender.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  assessment,	  many	  individuals	  
do	  not	  feel	  safe	  or	  acknowledged	  under	  current	  binary	  gender	  constructs.	  And	  although	  
individuals	  are	  able	  to	  directly	  challenge	  and	  transgress	  gender	  concepts,	  most	  gender	  
performances	  regularly	  involve	  some	  version	  of	  the	  masculine/feminine	  dichotomy	  (although	  
often	  presenting	  in	  quite	  varied	  and	  nuanced	  ways).	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  take	  what	  we	  
understand	  about	  gender,	  reconceptualising	  how	  gendered	  terms	  adequately	  reflect	  lived	  
reality.	  	  
	  
Many	  individuals	  and	  groups	  cannot	  voice	  their	  reality	  of	  gender	  or	  self	  under	  current	  systems	  
of	  gender	  identification.	  The	  benefit	  of	  the	  colour-­‐wheel	  is	  that	  it	  can	  overlap	  as	  a	  series	  of	  
slices	  of	  an	  individual’s	  experience.	  It	  has	  a	  two-­‐way	  benefit:	  first,	  it	  enables	  more	  relevant	  and	  
legitimate	  research	  because	  it	  has	  the	  scope	  to	  represent	  a	  variety	  of	  concepts	  at	  once;	  and	  
second,	  the	  individual	  has	  the	  benefit	  of	  feeling	  included	  by	  taking	  part	  in	  an	  exercise	  that	  
acknowledges	  and	  legitimises	  their	  experiences	  of	  gender.	  Recognition	  of	  gender	  is	  important	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to	  reduce	  the	  disparity	  between	  lived	  gender	  and	  structured	  gender	  dialogue.	  Legitimacy	  may	  
not	  resolve	  all	  forms	  of	  power	  relations	  that	  oppress,	  but	  it	  does	  enable	  fundamental	  human	  
rights	  of	  acknowledgment.	  
	  
The	  Colour-­‐Wheel	  of	  Gender	  Diversity	  endeavors	  to	  reflect	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  current	  
understandings	  of	  gender	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  exploring	  diversity	  for	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  individual	  or	  group	  needs.	  It	  is	  a	  model	  that	  supports	  fluidity,	  as	  issues	  that	  limit	  the	  
expression	  of	  gender	  diversity	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  through	  a	  binary	  system.	  Shifting	  the	  
perspective	  of	  gender	  identity	  and	  concepts	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  is	  a	  challenging	  
process.	  This	  model	  allows	  for	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  gender	  identities	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  gender	  
roles	  and	  expression	  that	  can	  be	  recorded	  and	  layered	  upon	  each	  other	  to	  represent	  multiple	  
gender	  realities.	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